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Article 
Drug Approval in a Learning Health 
System 
W. Nicholson Price II† 
INTRODUCTION 
When patients take unsafe drugs, they may die.1 When pa-
tients take ineffective drugs, the drugs won’t help them—and 
they may die. But when patients can’t access drugs, those drugs 
definitely can’t help them—and they may die anyway. This is a 
perennial problem for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
How much knowledge does FDA need about a drug’s safety and 
efficacy before the Agency can conclude that the drug is safe and 
effective enough to let the drug on the market?2 Where does it 
draw the line? 
This question has been debated vigorously for a long time. 
Some argue for earlier access with less information required, 
claiming that individual clinicians and patients are best suited 
to figure out what works best for them.3 Others prefer a more 
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Flood provided excellent research assistance. All errors are my own. Copyright 
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 1. Other bad things may also happen: patients may die a worse death, or 
they may die sooner, or they may miss the opportunity to take a better drug and 
not die at all. 
 2. Use is not the only question. Data about efficacy and safety also influ-
ence whether insurers should and will pay for the drug without wasting limited 
resources. For an analysis of the linkage between approval, data, and insurer 
reimbursement, see Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L. 
REV. 2307 (2018). 
 3. See infra Section I.A. 
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cautious approach, in which FDA requires even more infor-
mation before allowing a drug out into the market.4 Still others 
advocate for a more flexible, intermediate approach, combining 
earlier access for some drugs and more robust postapproval over-
sight to gather information after drugs are available.5 Such a 
combination blurs the line of standard FDA approval. Although 
in one sense approval is still a sharp binary—a drug is either 
approved for marketing or not—the attendant possibilities about 
when patients can access drugs and when information is gath-
ered become more complex.6 Aspects of this blurring process are 
taking place at FDA already. 
This shift at FDA parallels another blurring going on in the 
larger health-care system. In a “learning health system” (LHS), 
data are continuously collected in ongoing clinical care and are 
then used to learn about and improve that care.7 This is a big 
change from the current system, where systematic learning 
about health care takes place principally in clinical trials, and 
not much in clinical care.8 True LHSs are still in the future, but 
some health systems are implementing LHS practices,9 and 
there is considerable policy and scholarly support for the overall 
 
 4. See infra Section I.A. 
 5. See infra Section I.B. 
 6. E.g., INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND 
PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 1–14 (2007) [hereinafter INST. OF 
MED., DRUG SAFETY] (arguing for a “life cycle” approach where evidence about 
safety and efficacy are gathered both before and after drug approval); Anna B. 
Laakmann, Collapsing the Distinction Between Experimentation and Treatment 
in the Regulation of New Drugs, 62 ALA. L. REV. 305, 305 (2011) (arguing for a 
more fluid approach where doctors and patients make decisions based on accu-
mulated experiential knowledge). 
 7. See INST. OF MED., THE LEARNING HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: WORKSHOP 
SUMMARY 210 (2007) [hereinafter INST. OF MED., LEARNING HEALTHCARE]. The 
terms “learning health system,” “learning healthcare system,” and “learning 
health care system” are all used. 
 8. Id. at 3–6. 
 9. Geisinger Health System is one prominent example; its ability to use 
learning-health-system (LHS) techniques is enhanced because it is an inte-
grated health system, which provides both health care and insurance coverage 
for its members. See, e.g., Tom Foley & Fergus Fairmichael, Site Visit to 
Geisinger Health System, LEARNING HEALTHCARE PROJECT, http://www 
.learninghealthcareproject.org/section/evidence/38/63/site-visit-to-geisinger 
-health-system (last visited June 18, 2018); Susan D. Hall, Geisinger Research-
ers Share Framework for Putting a Learning Health System into Practice, 
FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/it/ 
geisinger-researchers-share-framework-for-putting-a-learning-health-system 
-into-practice. 
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project.10 An LHS blurs the line between clinical research and 
clinical care by tightly intertwining them. 
An LHS matters for drug approval for two reasons. First, a 
LHS enables a set of tools for managing the information land-
scape around FDA approval. Such a system prioritizes routinely 
gathering detailed information during clinical care. It also al-
lows simpler and cheaper pragmatic trials embedded in care. 
FDA can use those tools to gather and use postmarket data on 
drugs. For some time, FDA has been interested in using real-
world evidence from clinical practice to provide continuing over-
sight of medical devices;11 the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures 
Act), passed in December 2016, expressly directs the Agency to 
consider using such evidence to gather postapproval information 
about drugs.12 To the extent FDA accordingly promotes or even 
requires the use of learning health tools, like pragmatic trials 
embedded in clinical care, FDA not only benefits from an LHS 
but also can help drive its adoption. 
Second, the legal and ethical issues that crop up in imple-
menting an LHS, especially around informed consent and data 
privacy, shape how FDA or others can use the tools the system 
creates. Informed consent and privacy doctrines turn on a sharp 
distinction between research and clinical care; in each, research 
faces substantially higher burdens than care does. But that dis-
tinction depends on being able to define what research is, and 
how it differs from care—precisely the line that an LHS blurs. 
 
 10. Among other things, a new journal has been founded focused exclu-
sively on LHSs. See Charles P. Friedman et al., The Science of Learning Health 
Systems: Foundations for a New Journal, 1 LEARNING HEALTH SYS. 1, 1–2 
(2017) (explaining features of LHSs); see also AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & 
QUALITY, DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEARNING HEALTH SYSTEM RESEARCHER 
CORE COMPETENCIES 2–8 (2017), https://www.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/ 
wysiwyg/funding/training-grants/lhs-corecompetencies.pdf (discussing various 
methods used to develop LHS competencies); Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality and Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute Learning Health 
Systems Mentored Career Development Program (K12), NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH 
(Sept. 5, 2017), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-HS-17-012 
.html (calling for grant applications focused on LHSs). 
 11. See FDA, USE OF REAL-WORLD EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT REGULATORY 
DECISION-MAKING FOR MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 8–9 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ 
ucm513027.pdf [hereinafter FDA, REAL-WORLD EVIDENCE] (noting that FDA 
uses real-word evidence “across a wide spectrum, ranging from observational 
studies within an existing dataset to studies that incorporate planned interven-
tions with or without randomization at the point of care”). 
 12. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3022, 130 Stat. 1033, 
1096–98 (2016). 
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Those bright lines thus restrict what an LHS can do and how its 
tools can be used. 
This Article is divided into four Parts. Part I briefly can-
vasses the ongoing scholarly debate about drug approval, consid-
ering both the underlying spectrum between faster access and 
more knowledge and a set of proposals to help improve the ap-
proval process. Part II relates the larger context of a broader 
move to an LHS, a parallel and connected phenomenon that has 
been underexplored in the legal literature.13 Part III describes 
how an LHS helps generate postapproval information through 
both interventional and observational studies, noting the link 
between drug approval and an LHS. Part IV argues that out-
moded bright-line rules on privacy and informed consent hamper 
and bias both interventional and observational studies. It then 
suggests that those doctrines may need to change to account for 
the move to an LHS and the search for a better drug approval 
process. 
I.  BALANCING ACCESS AND KNOWLEDGE   
The FDA approval process involves balancing access to a 
drug with knowledge about the drug. The process by which FDA 
approves new drugs has been described in detail elsewhere.14 
For now, suffice it to say that FDA requires that a company seek-
ing to market a new drug submit reports from randomized clini-
cal trials to generate information about how the drug affects hu-
mans;15 these trials show that the drug is safe and effective for 
 
 13. For a significant exception, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Shifting Institu-
tional Roles in Biomedical Innovation in a Learning Healthcare System 3–10 
(Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Grp., Paper No. 560, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2984905 (describ-
ing the generation of knowledge for biomedical innovation in the context of an 
LHS and arguing that payers, in particular, have a substantial role to play in 
generating such knowledge once new technologies have been deployed into clin-
ical practice). For an example of government recognition of this link, see Robert 
M. Califf et al., Transforming Evidence Generation To Support Health and 
Health Care Decisions, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2395, 2396 (2016) (noting, in a 
joint article by high-level officials across several federal health-related agencies, 
including FDA, the need for interagency collaboration on data and system de-
sign to provide evidence for an LHS). 
 14. See, e.g., Arthur A. Ciociola et al., How Drugs Are Developed and Ap-
proved by the FDA: Current Process and Future Directions, 109 AM. J. GASTRO-
ENTEROLOGY 620, 621–22 (2014) (describing FDA’s drug development and ap-
proval process). 
 15. Id. at 621. 
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specified uses in humans (or not).16 FDA will then approve (or 
not) the drug for marketing and sale for specific indications 
based on this information.17 After that binary chokepoint, FDA 
loses some of its control over the drug.18 FDA doesn’t lose all 
control, of course; it still monitors manufacturing quality,19 col-
lects reports of drug safety problems,20 oversees marketing and 
advertising,21 and can impose limited controls on use22 or re-
move a drug from the market under certain conditions.23 But the 
drug is available for use. And because FDA does not regulate the 
practice of medicine (or at least, it says it doesn’t and many 
agree24), clinicians can prescribe the drug, even for uses beyond 
those approved by FDA.25 This off-label use can comprise much 
of a drug’s use.26 
 
 16. Id. A great many drug candidates, to be sure, are not safe and effective 
for human use, and the attrition rate in the drug development pipeline is quite 
high. See Michael Hay et al., Clinical Development Success Rates for Investiga-
tional Drugs, 32 NATURE BIOTECH. 40, 40–41 (2014). 
 17. Ciociola et al., supra note 14, at 622. 
 18. Id. 
 19. 21 C.F.R. § 211 (2017) (regulating manufacturing practices for finished 
pharmaceuticals). 
 20. See infra Section I.B.1.c. 
 21. See 21 C.F.R. § 202 (regulating prescription drug advertising); id. § 99 
(regulating off-label promotion of drugs). But see Christopher Robertson, When 
Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The Regulation of Drug Promotion Under an Ex-
panding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545, 546–55 (2014) (describing re-
cent cases limiting FDA’s authority to regulate off-label promotion); Patricia J. 
Zettler, The Indirect Consequences of Expanded Off-Label Promotion, 78 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1053, 1076–97 (2017) (noting potential consequences of those limits). 
 22. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (2012) (regulating with Risk Evaluation and Mitiga-
tion Strategies (REMS)); see, e.g., Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Ev-
identiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 503–15 (2010) (describing REMS). 
 23. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (describing drug withdrawal procedures); 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.150 (explaining drug approval withdrawals). 
 24. See, e.g., Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of Med-
icine, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427, 430 (2015) (“[T]he conventional wisdom among 
courts, lawmakers, and administrative agencies is that states regulate medical 
practice, while the federal government regulates medical products.”). But see id. 
at 460–66 (arguing that FDA in fact indirectly regulates medical practice 
through approval and REMS decisions, and in rare instances directly regulates 
medical practice). 
 25. See, e.g., Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence and Extrapolation: Mech-
anisms for Regulating Off-Label Uses of Drugs and Devices, 64 DUKE L.J. 377, 
387–88 (2014) (“[O]nce a drug is approved, physicians may prescribe the drug 
without restriction.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—Rethink-
ing the Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008) (“A 2003 report 
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The timing of approval matters not only for the exercise of 
regulatory powers, but also for FDA’s ability to gather infor-
mation. Drug sponsor motivation changes at approval. Before, 
sponsors are highly motivated to provide FDA with whatever in-
formation it needs to win approval. After, providing information 
risks raising problems or challenging the profitable status quo. 
Against this backdrop, when is the right time, along a timeline 
of increasing information about a drug, to make the drug avail-
able for use in the course of patient care? Is the current focus on 
preclinical trials the best way to learn about the effects of drugs? 
The following Sections consider the underlying tradeoff between 
access and information and a set of ways to blur the line of drug 
approval and thus make that tradeoff less sharp. 
A. THE UNDERLYING TRADEOFF BETWEEN ACCESS AND 
INFORMATION 
Some basic details about clinical trials help situate the de-
bate about when to approve drugs. FDA typically requires mul-
tiple randomized control clinical trials to establish safety and ef-
ficacy.27 But randomized clinical trials have inherent 
limitations.28 They are necessarily small—even the largest are 
numbered in the thousands—so while they can show average ef-
ficacy and basic safety, they cannot catch rare side effects or sub-
tle differences between different patient groups.29 Trials typi-
cally exclude patients with other diseases or who are taking 
other drugs, which doesn’t reflect the reality of many patients.30 
Similarly, trials often exclude relevant populations like preg-
nant women and children.31 Patients involved in trials are also 
 
showed that for the 3 leading drugs in each of the 15 leading drug classes, off-
label use accounted for approximately 21% of prescriptions.”). 
 27. Ciociola et al., supra note 14, at 621. 
 28. See Laakmann, supra note 6, at 327–30 (listing various limitations in-
herent to randomized clinical trials (RCTs)). 
 29. See id. at 327–28 (claiming three thousand participants as the typical 
enrollment in Phase III clinical trials while adverse reactions to drugs occurs at 
a ratio of one-in-one-thousand, meaning few, if any, participants will statisti-
cally suffer from an adverse reaction during such a trial). 
 30. Id. at 327. 
 31. See, e.g., Patrina H.Y. Caldwell et al., Clinical Trials in Children, 
364 LANCET 803, 803 (2004) (“In the absence of specific trial-based data in chil-
dren, clinicians, families and policy-makers are forced to extrapolate from re-
sults of studies in adults. This extrapolation is often inappropriate because chil-
dren have a different range of diseases, and metabolise medications differently, 
resulting in responses to treatment that are unpredictably different to adults.”); 
Barbara A. Noah, The Inclusion of Pregnant Women in Clinical Research, 7 ST. 
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 353, 355 (2014) (“Although there has been good 
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subject to much more careful monitoring than in the real world, 
so what we see in real-world use may not mirror what we see in 
trials.32 Last but not least, trials are usually relatively short—
they may last for months or years, but this does not tell us how 
a drug will perform (or its potential safety risks) over the course 
of decades or a lifetime.33 
Against this backdrop of clinical trials’ limitations, an ongo-
ing debate questions how much information should be gathered 
before drug approval. On one side are proponents for substan-
tially earlier access to new drugs. In this view, FDA’s role should 
be sharply limited; once a drug has been shown to be safe, it 
should be available for use by patients and providers without ad-
ditional requirements to demonstrate efficacy.34 The classic case 
arguing this point is Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach.35 
There, a group of terminally ill patients sued FDA, claiming a 
constitutional right to access experimental drugs that had been 
demonstrated “safe” (at least according to the patient advocates) 
because they had completed Phase I trials, but had not yet been 
proven effective.36 The D.C. Circuit held en banc in 2007 that no 
such right exists.37 Five years later, Andrew von Eschenbach—
FDA Commissioner from 2006 to 2009 and named defendant in 
 
progress in the inclusion of women in clinical research, the challenges of study-
ing the safety of drugs in pregnant women has caused clinical research with this 
population to lag, leaving physicians and patients with inadequate data on 
which to base prescribing decisions.”). 
 32. See Rachel E. Sherman et al., Real-World Evidence—What Is It and 
What Can It Tell Us?, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2293, 2294–96 (2016) (discussing 
limitations to clinical trials and real-world evidence). 
 33. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, II, Promoting 
Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCI. 3, 12–14 (2017). 
The challenge of clinical trial length may also have impacts on incentives for 
drug development. Longer clinical trials cut more into a drug’s patent life, which 
may lower incentives to develop drugs that require long trials. See Eric Budish 
et al., Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer 
Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044, 2044–49 (2015) (showing lower in-
vestment for drugs with long clinical trials). But see Vinay Prasad & Stephan 
Lindner, Why Is Research in Early-Stage Cancer Research So Low? A Re-As-
sessment of Budish, Roin and Williams (2015) (June 15, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with Minnesota Law Review) (questioning this result). 
 34. Andrew von Eschenbach, Medical Innovation: How the U.S. Can Retain 
Its Lead, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2012, at A19. 
 35. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschen-
bach, 495 F.3d 695, 707–10 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 36. Id. at 697–99. 
 37. Id. at 712–15; see also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554–
59 (1979) (holding that terminally ill patients could not access the unapproved 
drug Laetrile under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). 
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Abigail Alliance—authored a prominent Wall Street Journal ar-
ticle arguing that FDA should approve drugs based on safety 
alone, letting efficacy be proven later by the market.38 
This view has at least two problems. First, characterization 
of a drug as safe depends on whether it conveys a benefit, and is 
thus tough to disentangle from whether the drug is effective.39 
Second, preclinical trials are better at demonstrating efficacy 
than overall safety (after all, it’s what they are designed to do); 
they can show a lack of immediate toxicity, but they typically 
cannot show long-term safety or identify rare side effects.40 Nev-
ertheless, the argument that FDA should address only safety has 
considerable power. 
The power of the safety-only view has most recently mani-
fested in a spate of right-to-try laws.41 Thirty-seven states now 
have laws that purport to allow patients access to experimental 
drugs before FDA approval.42 These laws have had little practi-
cal impact in increasing access so far, in part because of limited 
incentives for drug manufacturers to provide early access to ex-
perimental drugs outside of FDA’s existing processes.43 But they 
clearly reflect the view that FDA should serve a more limited 
role in evaluating efficacy.44 Most of these state laws also faced 
federal preemption concerns when passed,45 but Congress has 
recently passed its own federal right-to-try law.46 
On the other side of the debate, others defend FDA’s caution 
and suggest that even more may be warranted.47 This view has 
 
 38. von Eschenbach, supra note 34. 
 39. Indeed, this was FDA’s rationale for evaluating drug efficacy well be-
fore the Kefauver-Harris Amendments gave it that explicit authority in 1962. 
DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 140–56 (2011). But this point is not 
essential to the story this Article tells. 
 40. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text. 
 41. See Patricia J. Zettler, Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 IND. L.J. 845, 
881–85 (2017) (explaining the process and purpose behind right to try laws). 
 42. Id. at 882. 
 43. Id. at 893–95; see also id. at 881–85. 
 44. Id. at 888–900. 
 45. Id. at 885–88. 
 46. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bel-
lina Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-176, 132 Stat. 1372 (2018). 
 47. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, New “21st Century Cures” 
Legislation: Speed and Ease Vs Science, 317 JAMA 581, 582 (2017) (arguing 
that emphasis on early access could reduce drug efficacy and safety standards 
and may reduce incentives for manufacturers to develop truly innovative and 
effective therapies); Chul Kim & Vinay Prasad, Strength of Validation for Sur-
rogate Endpoints Used in the US Food and Drug Administration’s Approval of 
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strong historical roots; much of FDA’s national and international 
prestige was cemented by its caution over the antinausea drug 
Thalidomide and its refusal to approve the drug before a plague 
of severe birth defects in Europe revealed the drug’s teratogen-
icity.48 The Agency has maintained its requirements for exten-
sive evidence in the face of calls for earlier access. This view is 
supported by safety and effectiveness problems that have re-
sulted from earlier access in some circumstances, as described 
below.49 
B. BLURRING THE LINE OF DRUG APPROVAL 
Flexible, blended approaches seek to avoid the stark terms 
of the tradeoff described above by allowing earlier access and 
promoting later data gathering. Some flexibility in FDA’s pro-
cess has already been enacted into law.50 But problems continue 
to arise in striking the proper balance on when drugs should be 
available and how, and thus scholars continue to suggest ways 
to improve the situation. These solutions tend to recognize that 
FDA approval occupies a somewhat arbitrary place on the slope 
of increasing knowledge, and they seek, in various ways, to 
 
Oncology Drugs, 91 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 713, 723 (2016); David Gorski, Donald 
Trump Versus the FDA: Is the Standard of Evidence for Drug Approval Actually 
Too Low Rather Than Too High?, SCI.-BASED MED. (Feb. 6, 2017), https:// 
sciencebasedmedicine.org/donald-trump-versus-the-fda-part-2; Matthew Her-
per, The FDA Is Basically Approving Everything. Here’s the Data To Prove It, 
FORBES (Aug. 20, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2015/08/ 
20/the-fda-is-basically-approving-everything-heres-the-data-to-prove-it. 
 48. CARPENTER, supra note 39, at 228–97; see also R. Alta Charo, Speed 
Versus Safety in Drug Development, in FDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: 
THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 252, 253 (I. 
Glenn Cohen & Holly Fernandez Lynch eds., 2015) (“The turning point [of FDA 
control] undoubtedly lies in the experience with thalidomide . . . .”). 
 49. See Jonathan J. Darrow et al., New FDA Breakthrough-Drug Cate-
gory—Implications for Patients, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1252, 1253–54 (2014) 
(noting that problems of safety and efficacy occur at a higher rate in drugs ap-
proved through accelerated pathways); Nicholas S. Downing et al., Clinical 
Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Approval of Novel Therapeutic Agents, 2005–
2012, 311 JAMA 368, 369 (2014); Nicholas S. Downing et al., Postmarket Safety 
Events Among Novel Therapeutics Approved by the US Food and Drug Admin-
istration Between 2001 and 2010, 317 JAMA 1854, 1854 (2017); infra Parts 
I.B.1, I.B.2 (describing faster approval and earlier access). 
 50. For a summary of recently approved drugs falling under the blended 
approach, see Novel Drugs Summary 2015, FDA (Jan. 2016), https://www.fda 
.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/druginnovation/ucm474696.htm. 
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change the information/access landscape around approval it-
self.51 This Section discusses existing approaches to approval 
flexibility, considers challenges to those approaches, and then 
identifies a set of scholars’ proposals for improvement.52 
1. Earlier Access with Postmarket Information 
Line-blurring approaches generally aim to get a new drug to 
patients sooner, while continuing the task of generating data 
about that drug after it has become available to patients. So far, 
Congress and FDA have adopted several ways to do this. Ways 
of getting the drug to patients sooner fall into two buckets: (1) 
permitting companies to allow certain patients to access the 
drug before it has been approved; and (2) speeding up the ap-
proval process. Gathering information about the drug can also 
happen in multiple ways, including various types of postmarket 
drug-safety surveillance and FDA-mandated studies. 
a. Faster Approval and Earlier Access 
Four mechanisms have been created to let FDA approve 
drugs faster than normal: (1) accelerated approval; (2) break-
through therapy designation; (3) fast-track designation; and (4) 
priority review.53 Accelerated approval explicitly moves the 
point of approval earlier by deliberately trading earlier infor-
mation for earlier access by patients, with commitments by the 
drug sponsor to develop more information later.54 This program 
 
 51. For an interesting examination of the difference between experimental 
and nonexperimental treatment in the context of medical care more generally, 
and the implications of that difference for informed consent in care, see Lars 
Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Ex-
perimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361 (2002). 
 52. An exhaustive approach to proposed solutions is beyond the scope of 
this Article. For a description of related approaches not considered here, see, for 
example, Ryan Abbott, Big Data and Pharmacovigilance: Using Health Infor-
mation Exchanges to Revolutionize Drug Safety, 99 IOWA L. REV. 225 (2013) (ar-
guing for the use of health information exchanges to enable drug surveillance 
efforts and proposing a bounty for third parties who identify drug safety prob-
lems); Abbott & Ayres, supra note 25 (arguing for increased reporting and post-
market study of off-label uses of drugs and tiered labeling for different uses). 
 53. See AS Kesselheim & JJ Darrow, FDA Designations for Therapeutics 
and Their Impact on Drug Development and Regulatory Review Outcomes, 
97 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 29, 31–32 (2015). Other mecha-
nisms try to speed up FDA’s normal process by providing increased resources 
and statutory timing mandates; the various Prescription Drug User Fee Acts 
take this tack. Id. 
 54. See Accelerated Approval, FDA (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.fda.gov/ 
ForPatients/Approvals/Fast/ucm405447.htm. 
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is available for new drugs for serious medical conditions that fill 
unmet needs.55 Under accelerated approval, FDA can approve a 
drug based on surrogate endpoints instead of true clinical end-
points.56 That is, instead of concluding that a drug is effective 
based on something we care about (e.g., fewer heart attacks), 
FDA can base its decision on a surrogate that we think is related 
to the clinical outcome we care about (e.g., lower cholesterol, 
which is linked to fewer heart attacks). But sometimes this lack 
of direct information means that the approved drug doesn’t ac-
tually help achieve the clinical endpoint—that is, it doesn’t help 
patients.57 FDA tries to combat this problem by mandating 
postapproval studies, but these often do not work out as 
planned.58 The other three mechanisms focus on more intense 
communication between FDA and the drug sponsor or on allo-
cating resources within FDA to focus on a drug of particular in-
terest, and thus do not implicate the information/access tradeoff 
as clearly.59 Nevertheless, these faster mechanisms also come 
with risks based on their speed and potentially lowered infor-
mation standards.60 
A separate set of programs doesn’t speed up the FDA ap-
proval process, but instead lets more patients access a drug be-
fore it has been approved. These programs are collectively 
known as “expanded access” or “compassionate use,” and include 
both “individual access,” where a drug is offered to one patient 
(or a very small group of patients), and a “treatment IND,” where 
an investigational new drug is used to treat a group of patients.61 
Notably, data from such programs are not generally collected 
systematically for use by FDA in the drug approval process.62 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. This lack of efficacy can occur for multiple reasons, including that the 
surrogate is not a good marker for the clinical endpoint and that long-term ef-
fects do not mirror short-term trial results. See, e.g., John R. Johnson et al., 
Accelerated Approval of Oncology Products: The Food and Drug Administration 
Experience, 103 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 636, 636 (2011) (concluding that, in a 
review of oncology drugs granted accelerated approval based on surrogate end-
points, confirmatory evidence of safety and efficacy was eventually developed 
for about half of the drugs after postmarket studies (twenty-six out of forty-
seven), with three removed from the market and trials for the remaining eight-
een not yet completed at the time of the review). 
 58. See infra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 59. See Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 53, at 31–33. 
 60. See id. at 33–35. 
 61. See Laakmann, supra note 6, at 321–24. 
 62. Id. at 331. 
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b. Postmarket Surveillance 
On the other side of the picture, a number of existing mech-
anisms help FDA gather information about drugs after they 
have been approved and enter clinical care. Drug manufacturers 
are required to report adverse events using the FDA Adverse 
Event Reporting System (FAERS), but this includes only ad-
verse events that are reported to the manufacturer; most are 
not.63 Clinicians and patients may also report adverse events di-
rectly to FDA, but few do.64 These systems are passive, in that 
FDA waits for others to report potential problems. Unfortu-
nately, only around one percent of serious adverse events are re-
ported to FDA through these passive channels.65 
Under the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act 
of 2007 (FDAAA), FDA has vastly increased its own active sur-
veillance capacity.66 It created the Sentinel System, which aims 
to answer postmarket safety questions by surveilling the elec-
tronic health records (EHRs) of over 100,000,000 Americans.67 
Sentinel is federated; data stay on the systems of FDA’s partners 
(hospitals, health systems, and similar entities), which return 
aggregated data responsive to queries that FDA asks the sys-
tem.68 Although this vastly increases the possibility of verifying 
potential problems once they come to FDA’s attention, the sys-
tem is much less helpful at actively noticing problems in the first 
 
 63. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c) (2017) (reporting requirements); Jonathan J. Dar-
row, Crowdsourcing Clinical Trials, 98 MINN. L. REV. 805, 837 (2014) (stating 
that most adverse events go unreported). 
 64. See Toshiyuki Sakaeda et al., Data Mining of the Public Version of the 
FDA Adverse Event Reporting System, 10 INT’L J. MED. SCI. 796, 800 (2013). 
 65. See Efthimios Parasidis, FDA’s Public Health Imperative: An Increased 
Role for Active Postmarket Analysis, in FDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 
supra note 48, at 286, 289. 
 66. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 § 905, 
21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)–(4) (2012). 
 67. See id. § 355(k)(3) (granting statutory authority to create Sentinel); 
INST. OF MED., DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE LEARNING HEALTH SYSTEM: 
THE FOUNDATION FOR CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT IN HEALTH AND HEALTH 
CARE 259–65 (2011) [hereinafter INST. OF MED., DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE] (de-
scribing Sentinel and its Mini-Sentinel pilot program). For discussions of pri-
vacy and informed consent issues in the context of the Sentinel System in par-
ticular, see, for example, KRISTEN ROSATI, AN ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ISSUES 
RELATED TO STRUCTURING FDA SENTINEL INITIATIVE ACTIVITIES 73–74 (2009); 
KRISTEN ROSATI ET AL., HIPAA AND COMMON RULE COMPLIANCE IN THE MINI-
SENTINEL PILOT (2010); Barbara J. Evans, Congress’ New Infrastructural Model 
of Medical Privacy, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585 (2009) [hereinafter Evans, New 
Infrastructural Model]. 
 68. 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3). 
 2018] A LEARNING HEALTH SYSTEM 2425 
 
place. Someone has to know what questions to ask,69 and asking 
the questions is itself a relatively complex task.70 In addition, 
FDA has limited resources to run studies using Sentinel on its 
own initiative.71 
c. Postmarket Studies 
Finally, FDA need not rely on surveillance alone; in certain 
situations, it can require active studies by drug sponsors after a 
drug has been approved. The FDAAA authorizes FDA to impose 
postmarket study requirements as a condition of approval;72 al-
ternatively, the drug sponsor can voluntarily agree to conduct 
such studies to ease the path to approval.73 FDA can also impose 
such requirements after a drug has been approved in response 
to new evidence of safety risks, which are defined very broadly.74 
Section 505(o)(3) of the FDAAA establishes a preference 
that FDA must follow when deciding what sort of postmarket 
activity to require.75 If the safety question can be answered using 
FDA’s regular resources—including FAERS and Sentinel—FDA 
must use those.76 If those resources “will not be sufficient,”77 
FDA can order the manufacturer to perform a postmarketing 
“study,” which includes epidemiological studies, other observa-
tional studies, lab experiments, and animal studies—essentially 
anything that is not a clinical trial.78 If that type of non-human-
interventional study will not be sufficient, only then can FDA 
require that the drug sponsor perform a postmarketing clinical 
 
 69. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 33, at 43. 
 70. See Darrow, supra note 63, at 841. 
 71. Barbara J. Evans, The Ethics of Postmarketing Observational Studies 
of Drug Safety Under 505(o)(3) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 38 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 577, 597 (2012). 
 72. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3). 
 73. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: POSTMARKETING STUDIES AND CLINI-
CAL TRIALS—IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 505(O)(3) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, 
DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 7 (2011) [hereinafter FDA, POSTMARKETING STUD-
IES] (noting the distinction between postmarketing studies required under the 
FDAAA and voluntary postmarketing study commitments that do not meet 
FDAAA statutory criteria for required postmarketing studies and clinical tri-
als). 
 74. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(B); Evans, supra note 71, at 585; see also Par-
asidis, supra note 65, at 293–94 (arguing that new safety information is defined 
so broadly as to allow the imposition of postmarket studies for essentially all 
drugs). 
 75. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3). 
 76. Id. § 355(o)(3)(D)(i)–(ii); id. § 355(k)(1), (3). 
 77. Id. § 355(o)(3)(D)(i)–(ii). 
 78. FDA, POSTMARKETING STUDIES, supra note 73, at 4. 
 2426 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2413 
 
trial, defined as “any prospective investigation[] in which the 
[drug sponsor] or investigator determines the method of assign-
ing the drug[] or other interventions to . . . human subjects.”79 
Essentially, postmarket clinical trials are a last resort, to be 
used only if FDA’s own mechanisms or firm-conducted observa-
tional studies are inadequate. 
2. Challenges 
Line-blurring trades earlier access with less information for 
the promise of later information. Earlier access brings its own 
risks—otherwise, what would be the point of the regular pro-
cess?80 More intense postmarket information-gathering is sup-
posed to alleviate that concern. With more information later, 
FDA can better observe how the drug works, catch problems ear-
lier, and act if necessary. 
Unfortunately, it turns out that collecting postmarket infor-
mation is quite tricky. Drug sponsors don’t have especially good 
incentives to collect information about drugs that are already be-
ing sold and making a profit, especially if that information might 
reveal safety problems or a lack of efficacy that could hurt sales 
or result in the drugs being removed from the market.81 Volun-
tary submission of data by patients and clinicians is infrequent, 
patchy, and biased—possibly good for finding previously unno-
ticed rare side effects and adverse reactions, but not very helpful 
for gathering evidence of efficacy or safety more broadly.82 And 
Sentinel, while impressive, has relatively limited resources and 
is better for query-driven safety evaluations than noting new 
problems or demonstrating efficacy.83 
Conducting postmarket clinical trials is even harder than 
passively gathering information. Drug companies have the same 
limited incentives to generate potentially negative information 
about profit-generating drugs, but now those incentives are bal-
anced against the high expense of clinical trials.84 Patients often 
aren’t especially interested in being part of a randomized clinical 
trial on a drug that is already available for clinical use—why 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. See, Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 53, at 29. 
 81. Eisenberg & Price, supra note 33, at 4. 
 82. See supra Section I.B.1.b. 
 83. See supra Section I.B.1.b. 
 84. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 33, at 18. Other drug companies have 
even less incentive, unless they are conducting comparative-effectiveness re-
search—which runs the risk of finding their own drugs less effective. Id. 
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take a fifty percent chance of getting the drug you want through 
a clinical trial when you could have a 100% chance of getting it 
through your clinician?85 And if the drug has at least some evi-
dence that it works better than alternatives available in such a 
trial, it may be arguably unethical even to conduct the trial.86 
As a result of some combination of these factors, postap-
proval trial commitments have not been a resounding success; a 
large number are never completed, even when required by 
FDA.87 
Finally, even when information is gathered that calls for de-
cisive FDA action, the Agency may not act. FDA has a set of tools 
at its disposal, ranging from making voluntary requests to man-
ufacturers, to requiring changes to a drug’s label,88 to imposing 
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS)89 that can 
limit how drugs can be used, to requiring withdrawal of the drug 
from the market.90 But it is harder to withdraw approval of a 
drug once it is already on the market than to delay or refuse ap-
proval in the first place because patients are already using it and 
some—rightly or wrongly—think it is helping them.91 Once pa-
tients are already taking a drug, intense political pressure can 
weigh against limiting future use of the drug.92 Withdrawal from 
the market does happen—the blockbuster drug Vioxx is a key 
example93—but it is rare, and typically firms withdraw drugs 
 
 85. See Evans, supra note 71, at 587–88. 
 86. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CLINICAL TRI-
ALS 45 (3d ed. 1996); see also BENGT D. FURBERG & CURT D. FURBERG, EVALU-
ATING CLINICAL RESEARCH: ALL THAT GLITTERS IS NOT GOLD 21 (2d ed. 2007) 
(discussing the view that withholding a proven beneficial intervention may vio-
late the ethical research standards of the Declaration of Helsinki). 
 87. See Kevin Fain et al., The Food and Drug Administration Amendments 
Act and Postmarketing Commitments, 310 JAMA 202, 202–03 (2013) (finding 
low completion rates); Steven Woloshin et al., The Fate of FDA Postapproval 
Studies, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1114, 1114 (2017) (finding the same). 
 88. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (2012). 
 89. Id. § 355-1. 
 90. 21 C.F.R. § 314.150 (2017). 
 91. See also Zettler, supra note 21, at 1092 (noting pressure on FDA to avoid 
withdrawing approval for the drug Avastin). 
 92. See, e.g., Shannon G. Gibson & Trudo Lemmens, Niche Markets and 
Evidence Assessment in Transition: A Critical Review of Proposed Drug Re-
forms, 22 MED. L. REV. 200, 216–17 (2014) (discussing this challenge in inter-
national contexts). 
 93. See generally Jennifer Couzin, Withdrawal of Vioxx Casts a Shadow 
over COX-2 Inhibitors, 306 SCIENCE 384 (2004). 
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voluntarily rather than under an FDA mandate.94 Limiting an 
approved drug’s use is also hard. FDA can limit the indications 
for which a drug is approved, but once the drug is available cli-
nicians can readily prescribe it for off-label uses.95 In extreme 
cases FDA may use REMS to limit how a drug is used,96 but in 
run-of-the-mill cases, FDA’s ability to control prescribing is quite 
limited.97 
In sum, line-blurring approaches to FDA approval are hard. 
Additions to the approval process have made it easier to get 
drugs to patients earlier, but the second part of the approach—
collecting and using postapproval information—remains chal-
lenging. 
3. Suggested Improvements 
Several scholars have suggested how we might improve the 
system, especially postapproval information gathering. The five 
proposals below address different ways to link earlier access 
with better development of information after approval, whether 
in the health system generally, through conditional approval 
with standard evidence generation by firms, by encouraging pa-
tients to submit their own data for analysis, or by requiring ac-
tive study by sponsors of all drugs. 
Anna Laakmann argues that “the FDA should formally rec-
ognize the blurred line between experimentation and treatment 
by adopting a more fluid approach to its review of new medical 
technologies.”98 She notes that a tremendous amount of infor-
mation about drug safety and efficacy goes unrecorded or ig-
nored, some preapproval (when patients ineligible for a trial get 
access through a different pathway),99 but most postapproval 
(when clinical results are not recorded or are not available for 
 
 94. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 33, at 10–12. Even there, FDA was 
reluctant to take postapproval data, generated by insurers rather than the drug 
sponsor, into consideration. See id. 
 95. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Gibson & Lemmens, supra note 92, at 212. This approach may face 
political challenges. See id. at 213. 
 97. See Zettler, supra note 21, at 1080–86. Gibson and Lemmens have sug-
gested that insurers could shape drug use by reimbursing only for uses with 
supporting evidence, though they note political and practical difficulties with 
this approach. Gibson & Lemmens, supra note 92, at 213. Rebecca Eisenberg 
and I have suggested in a similar vein that insurers should develop information 
about drug use to save costs on unapproved uses. Eisenberg & Price, supra note 
33, at 28–29. 
 98. Laakmann, supra note 6, at 305. 
 99. Id. at 331. 
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study).100 Accordingly, she argues for the creation of a “central 
database which serves as a clearinghouse of experiential infor-
mation on the effects of new drugs.”101 She links this proposal 
explicitly to those drugs that receive approval through fast-track 
procedures, but suggests that more drugs could become eligible 
for such procedures if their manufacturers would commit to her 
proposed scheme of data collection.102 
Alta Charo recognizes that many approaches “focus on get-
ting drugs out faster and correcting mistakes later;”103 to facili-
tate this approach, she suggests relying on conditional approval 
and associated marketing restrictions.104 In a conditional-ap-
proval process, drugs for serious unmet needs are approved only 
on the condition that the drug sponsors later generate postap-
proval data by drug companies’ observational studies or clinical 
trials.105 Charo suggests that such a system could enable FDA to 
place limits on marketing—such that drug use could be confined 
to those for whom strong evidence of safety and efficacy is avail-
able—that might otherwise be infeasible.106 Shannon Gibson 
and Trudo Lemmens similarly advocate conditional approval, 
with limits enforced by the use of REMS, especially in the con-
text of niche drugs and pharmacogenomics products.107 Gibson 
and Lemmens argue for expanded postmarket data gathering to 
support these efforts.108 
Jonathan Darrow comes at the blurred line of drug approval 
from a different direction, relying on patients to share experien-
tial data themselves.109 He notes that FDA approval—even in 
the normal order—still leaves many effects of drugs unknown 
because of the inherent limitations of preapproval clinical trials, 
 
 100. Id. at 345. 
 101. Id. at 341. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Charo, supra note 48, at 251. 
 104. Id. at 257–59. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 257–63. 
 107. Shannon Gibson & Trudo Lemmens, Overcoming “Premarket Syn-
drome”: Promoting Better Postmarket Surveillance in an Evolving Drug-Devel-
opment Context, in FDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 48, at 268, 
275–78. 
 108. Id. at 278–79. Trudo and Lemmens also note a third binary becoming 
blurred: coverage with evidence development, a scheme in which reimburse-
ment for a drug is tied to the continuing development of evidence for its use. Id. 
at 279–81. 
 109. Darrow, supra note 63, at 826. 
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and thus that even postapproval use is still essentially experi-
mental for some years after approval.110 This is particularly true 
in subject populations excluded from the clinical trials, such as 
pregnant women and children.111 Thus Darrow suggests that 
FDA should grant drugs conditional approval and then conduct 
“crowdsourced clinical trials,” wherein patients taking the drug 
provide information about their experience through a widely 
available web form where they can also learn more about the 
drug.112 
Efthimios Parasidis would push harder on FDA to require 
postmarket studies.113 He argues that FDA has focused almost 
entirely on premarket evaluations, and that its system of “pas-
sive postmarket surveillance” is seriously inadequate.114 Accord-
ingly, he argues that FDA should mandate active postmarket 
surveillance by sponsors for all marketed drugs—either as a con-
dition of approval for new drugs, or as a reaction to the safety 
concerns raised by off-label use for already-approved drugs.115 
4. Information Gathering and the 21st Century Cures Act 
Overall, the regulatory pathways and scholarly proposals 
highlighted above reflect a developing reality for FDA approval. 
Premarket review is crucial, but has unavoidable flaws: pre-
market clinical trials have key limitations, and FDA faces strong 
pressure for access even before those trials can develop what in-
formation they are able. The result is a system gradually shifting 
toward a blended approach—a “lifecycle” approach to developing 
evidence, in the words of an influential Institute of Medicine re-
port—where information gathering both before and after ap-
proval are each key to regulation of drugs.116 Congress has re-
acted to this shift. 
 
 110. Id. at 810–11. 
 111. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 112. Darrow, supra note 63, at 826–31. But see Ameet Sarpatwari et al., 
Crowdsourcing Public Health Experiments: A Response to Jonathan Darrow’s 
Crowdsourcing Clinical Trials, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2326, 2329–33 (2014) (noting 
that FDA’s MedWatcher tool is already relatively flexible, and that self-reported 
observational studies such as the one Darrow proposes may be vulnerable to 
self-selection bias). 
 113. Parasidis, supra note 65. 
 114. Id. at 288–90; see also Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Ad-
dressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation of Medical Products, 2011 WISC. 
L. REV. 929, 932–33 (describing the legislative pressures that have resulted in 
FDA’s prioritization of premarket review over postmarket surveillance). 
 115. Parasidis, supra note 65, at 292–95. 
 116. See INST. OF MED., DRUG SAFETY, supra note 6. 
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In December 2016, President Obama signed into law the 
Cures Act, which among other things addresses the use of real-
world evidence in FDA decisionmaking.117 Section 3022 requires 
that FDA “establish a program to evaluate the potential use of 
real world evidence—(1) to help to support the approval of a new 
indication for a[n approved] drug . . . and (2) to help to support 
or satisfy postapproval study requirements.”118 The Cures Act 
defines “real world evidence” as “data regarding the usage, or the 
potential benefits or risks, of a drug derived from sources other 
than randomized clinical trials.”119 Although the Cures Act’s def-
initions are scanty, “real world evidence” likely includes data de-
rived from studies undertaken in the course of clinical care,120 
even the randomized interventional studies discussed below, en-
abled by an LHS.121 The Cures Act does not require FDA to ac-
tually use real-world evidence—only to evaluate its potential use 
and to issue guidance122—but it clearly contemplates that a 
broad swath of evidence gathered in the course of clinical care 
may be used for the purposes of broadening a drug’s approved 
indications or monitoring safety after approval. These purposes 
do not capture everything that can be done to evaluate drugs in 
an LHS, but they encourage substantial FDA involvement. 
FDA has expressed its intention to consider real-world evi-
dence, beginning even before the passage of the Cures Act. In a 
prominent 2016 article, Robert Califf, the outgoing Commis-
sioner of FDA, wrote with his colleagues about the uses of real-
 
 117. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3022, 130 Stat. 1033, 
1096–98 (2016) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 505F (2012) ) (amending the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act to add § 505F). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Although the Act does not define “clinical trials,” section 2053 refers to 
“applicable clinical trial[s] as defined in section 402(j) [of the Public Health Ser-
vices Act].” § 2053, 130 Stat. at 1076. That section, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 282(j) 
(2012), defines an “applicable clinical trial” to include an “applicable drug clini-
cal trial,” id. § 282(j)(1)(A)(i), which in turn is defined as a “controlled clinical 
investigation, other than a phase I clinical investigation, of [a drug or a bio-
logic],” id. § 282(j)(1)(A)(iii)(I), where a “clinical investigation” is defined in the 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), id. § 282(j)(1)(A)(iii)(II). Finally, that CFR 
provision defines a “clinical investigation” as “any experiment in which a drug 
is administered or dispensed to, or used involving, one or more human subjects. 
For the purposes of this part, an experiment is any use of a drug except for the 
use of a marketed drug in the course of medical practice.” 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) 
(2017) (emphasis added). 
 121. See infra Section III.B. 
 122. 21st Century Cures Act § 3022. 
 2432 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2413 
 
world evidence in evaluating drugs.123 They noted the possibili-
ties of using data collected during ongoing health care, and the 
fact that these data can avoid the challenges and disadvantages 
of relatively small, limited-population, short-term clinical tri-
als.124 
FDA appears similarly supportive under Commissioner 
Scott Gottlieb. An August article by FDA officials addressed the 
definition and gathering of real-world evidence in considerable 
detail.125 In September 2017, Commissioner Gottlieb described 
the adoption of real-world evidence in regulatory decisions at 
FDA as a high priority, arguing that the Agency “need[s] to close 
the evidence gap between the information [it] use[s] to make [its] 
decisions, and the evidence increasingly used by the medical 
community, by payers, and by others charged with making 
health-care decisions.”126 He criticized the traditional approach 
that evaluates a product “based on a data set that speaks to a 
limited and rigidly constructed circumstance, when the clinical 
use, and in turn the evidence we might have to evaluate the 
product, could have been far richer, far more diverse, and more 
informative[.]”127 Finally, he explicitly addressed the blurring of 
the line between premarket and postmarket evaluation of medi-
cal products, and suggested that FDA is embracing this blur-
ring.128 
This Part has described the development of an approach to 
FDA approval that broadens the scope of information gathering, 
focusing not only on premarket clinical trials but also on infor-
mation developed after approval. This information is useful not 
only to balance the possibility of earlier access, but also more 
generally to align what we know about drugs with how they are 
actually used and how they actually work. So far, so good: this 
ongoing shift has been recognized before—including by FDA—
even if the Cures Act is a new source of statutory impetus and 
authorization. But how does this shift square with other changes 
 
 123. Sherman et al., supra note 32. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See generally Jonathan P. Jarow et al., Multidimensional Evidence Gen-
eration and FDA Regulatory Decision Making: Defining and Using “Real-World” 
Data, 318 JAMA 703 (2017). 
 126. Scott Gottlieb, Commissioner, FDA, Remarks by Dr. Gottlieb to the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences on the Impact of Real World Evidence on Medical 
Product Development (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Speeches/ucm576519.htm. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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to the health-care system more broadly? Part II addresses this 
question. 
II.  A LEARNING HEALTH SYSTEM   
Alongside the evolution of the FDA approval system, the 
broader health-care system is itself slowly evolving into an LHS. 
The idea of an LHS crystallized in a 2007 report by the Institute 
of Medicine, which described an LHS as “one in which knowledge 
generation is so embedded into the core of the practice of medi-
cine that it is a natural outgrowth and product of the health-care 
delivery process and leads to continual improvement in care.”129 
Other reports have followed.130 
Why do we need an LHS? The health system today involves 
far too much error and unnecessary treatment, with high costs 
in both money and health.131 Many provider actions are under-
taken with relatively little evidence about how well they work 
and how they might work best.132 Even when there is new evi-
dence of best practices, it takes a long time for improvements to 
make their way into routine care.133 In large part, this is because 
clinical trials, with their inherent limits,134 simply don’t provide 
all the information the health system needs to provide the best 
care.135 At the same time, though, the health system itself gen-
erates vast amounts of information about how clinical care 
 
 129. INST. OF MED., LEARNING HEALTHCARE, supra note 7, at 6. 
 130. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CON-
TINUOUSLY LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2013); 
INST. OF MED., CLINICAL DATA AS THE BASIC STAPLE OF HEALTH LEARNING: 
CREATING AND PROTECTING A PUBLIC GOOD (Claudia Grossman et al. eds, 
2010); INST. OF MED., DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 67. 
 131. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH 
SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). 
 132. INST. OF MED., LEARNING HEALTHCARE, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
 133. See Zoë S. Morris et al., The Answer Is 17 Years, What Is the Question: 
Understanding Time Lags in Translational Research, 104 J. ROYAL SOC’Y 
MED. 510 (2011) (noting repeated findings that health-care innovations take an 
average of seventeen years to be incorporated into clinical practice). 
 134. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text. 
 135. INST. OF MED., LEARNING HEALTHCARE, supra note 7, at 2 (“[B]eyond 
determinations of basic efficacy and safety, the dependence on individually de-
signed, serially constructed, prospective studies to establish relative effective-
ness and individual variation in efficacy and safety is simply impractical for 
most interventions.” (citations omitted)); cf. Kayte Spector-Bagdady et al., 
Stemming the Standard-of-Care Sprawl: Clinician Self-Interest and the Case of 
Electronic Fetal Monitoring, 47 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 16 (2017) (discussing rea-
sons other than a lack of knowledge that evidence-based practices do not diffuse 
rapidly into clinical care). 
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works—because clinicians provide care, patients receive it, and 
how those things happen can tell us how the care is working (or 
isn’t). Unfortunately, we’ve traditionally ignored that infor-
mation; the health system doesn’t capture it particularly well, 
and typically doesn’t use it well when it is captured.136 An LHS 
could change that. 
In an LHS, health-care actors (clinicians, hospitals, phar-
macies, and others) systematically capture data about what ac-
tually happens in health care—patients’ symptoms, how they 
are treated, and how they do over time—in EHRs.137 This part 
happens to some extent already, though that is quite a recent 
development, and the transition to EHRs is very much still a 
work in progress.138 In an LHS, data capture is much more sys-
tematic and pervasive.139 But an LHS need not only observe 
care. “Practical” or “pragmatic” clinical trials involve actively 
generating knowledge in the context of clinical care by, for in-
stance, randomizing between different treatments that are all 
accepted standards of care and measuring the results.140 
An LHS not only generates data, it uses those data to learn. 
Actors in the system continuously analyze collected data to find 
new evidence about what works and what doesn’t—which pa-
tients need surgery and which don’t, which drugs work better for 
whom, what quality improvement mechanisms make a differ-
ence, and which standard-of-care practice is superior.141 These 
results are then fed back into the system, where information-
sharing occurs not only through traditional publication but also 
through updated practice guidelines, presentations, or even au-
tomatically, such as when EHRs themselves provide decision 
support to providers and make recommendations based on the 
most up-to-date information.142 The overall goal is to use the 
 
 136. See, e.g., Laakmann, supra note 6, at 345 (“An additional cost of the 
FDA’s predominate focus on premarketing review is the loss of ‘phantom’ expe-
riential information that is not effectively captured in the treatment setting.”). 
 137. INST. OF MED., LEARNING HEALTHCARE, supra note 7, at 17–18. 
 138. See generally SHARONA HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND 
MEDICAL BIG DATA: LAW AND POLICY (2016) (detailing the challenges and suc-
cesses of Electronic Health Records systems and recommending approaches for 
the improvement of such systems). 
 139. See INST. OF MED., LEARNING HEALTHCARE, supra note 7, at 48. 
 140. See Sean R. Tunis et al., Practical Clinical Trials: Increasing the Value 
of Clinical Research for Decision Making in Clinical and Health Policy, 
290 JAMA 1624, 1626 (2003); infra Section III.B. 
 141. See generally Sarah M. Greene et al., Implementing the Learning 
Health System: From Concept to Action, 157 ANNALS INT. MED. 207 (2012). 
 142. Id.  
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vast troves of data that health care generates to learn more 
about and improve the process of providing that care—and to do 
it repeatedly, continuously learning and improving.143 
Stating the idea is easy, but getting it to work is hard. The 
2007 Institute of Medicine report notes several challenges re-
lated to data quality, health-data infrastructure, actually con-
ducting studies, implementing changes, and other aspects of an 
LHS;144 there is a growing literature around how to actually im-
plement an LHS.145 The fragmentation of our health-care sys-
tem—different actors collect different information in different 
settings—makes the goal harder to achieve.146 In addition, the 
ethics of an LHS are also contested.147 Rather than attempting 
to address all of these issues—themselves the subject of a sub-
stantial literature—this Article focuses on the line-blurring in-
volved in an LHS, the implications of that blurring for gathering 
and using information about drugs, and related legal complica-
tions. 
An LHS blurs the line between research and clinical care. 
The classic model has these two sharply separated: research 
aims at systematically generating generalizable knowledge, 
while care aims to improve an individual patient’s health.148 In 
 
 143. See, e.g., id. at 209–10 (describing the implementation of this continu-
ous cyclic approach). 
 144. INST. OF MED., LEARNING HEALTHCARE, supra note 7, at 1–6. 
 145. See, e.g., Greene et al., supra note 141; Ronald A. Paulus et al., Contin-
uous Innovation in Health Care: Implications of the Geisinger Experience, 27 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1235 (2008); Wayne Psek et al., Leadership Perspectives on 
Operationalizing the Learning Health Care System in an Integrated Delivery 
System, 4 EGEMS 1233 (2016); Wayne A. Psek et al., Operationalizing the 
Learning Health Care System in an Integrated Delivery System, 3 EGEMS 1122 
(2015); Glenn D. Steele et al., How Geisinger ’s Advanced Medical Home Model 
Argues the Case for Rapid-Cycle Innovation, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 2047 (2010). 
 146. See, e.g., Alan M. Garber & Jonathan Skinner, Is American Health Care 
Uniquely Inefficient?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2008) (noting the popular wisdom 
that the American health care system is exceptionally fragmented); see also W. 
Nicholson Price II, Risk and Resilience in Health Data Infrastructure, 16 COLO. 
TECH. L.J. 65 (2018) (discussing fragmentation of health data systems). 
 147. See, e.g., Ruth R. Faden et al., An Ethics Framework for a Learning 
Health Care System: A Departure from Traditional Research Ethics and Clinical 
Ethics, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S16 (2013); Christine Grady & David Wendler, 
Making the Transition to a Learning Health Care System, 43 HASTINGS CTR. 
REP. S32 (2013); Nancy E. Kass et al., The Research-Treatment Distinction: A 
Problematic Approach for Determining Which Activities Should Have Ethical 
Oversight, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S4 (2013). 
 148. Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Research, Report of the National Commission for the Pro-
tection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 
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fact, an entire strand of literature on the “therapeutic miscon-
ception” notes the problems that arise when patients incorrectly 
believe that research-oriented clinical trials will provide care.149 
On the care side, the purpose is to provide care to individuals, 
not to generate knowledge. In this model, providers record data 
principally to note current care, to inform future care, and to fa-
cilitate payment.150 
The LHS bucks that model by aiming to capture and use 
data from health care. In doing this, it transforms care from 
something that is only about providing care to something that is 
also about generating knowledge to improve future care through 
learning—so much so that Ruth Faden and her colleagues argue 
that both clinicians and patients have an obligation to contribute 
to learning.151 This learning should be systematic, in a way that 
looks much more like research does now. There are still situa-
tions, even in an LHS, that are completely distinct. Phase I clin-
ical trials, for instance, are conducted on healthy volunteers to 
test the safety of a new drug.152 These studies are not care; they 
are only research.153 But in general, LHSs blur the line between 
research and care for many situations. 
The shift to an LHS shares key characteristics with the shift 
to a more flexible FDA approval process. Each attempts to im-
prove the way we understand and use health interventions. Each 
 
23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2017)); Howard Brody & Frank-
lin G. Miller, The Research-Clinical Practice Distinction, Learning Health Sys-
tems, and Relationships, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 41, 42 (2013); but see Noah, 
supra note 51, at 387–88 (arguing that the Belmont Report and its successors 
recognize a spectrum from research to clinical care). 
 149. See generally Paul S. Appelbaum et al., False Hopes and Best Data: 
Consent to Research and the Therapeutic Misconception, 17 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 
20 (1987). This is not always the case; in some cases, notably pediatric oncology, 
clinical trials are the principal avenue by which care is provided. See, e.g., Emily 
A. Largent et al., Can Research and Care Be Ethically Integrated?, 41 HASTINGS 
CTR. REP. 37, 39 (2011). 
 150. See Martha Hostetter & Sarah Klein, Using Patient-Reported Outcomes 
To Improve Health Care Quality, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 2012), http:// 
www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletters/quality-matters/2011/ 
december-january-2012/in-focus. 
 151. Faden et al., supra note 147, at S22. Faden and colleagues do not argue 
that patients have a duty to participate in experimental research, but others do. 
See, e.g., John Harris, Scientific Research Is a Moral Duty, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 
242, 247 (2005); Rosamond Rhodes, In Defense of the Duty To Participate in Bi-
omedical Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 37, 38 (2008). 
 152. See Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Esch-
enbach, 495 F.3d 695, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing the different phases of 
drug testing). 
 153. Id. 
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turns on generating information and applying that information 
in an ongoing process of developing and using those health in-
terventions. And each rejects simple, bright-line distinctions 
about when that information should be gathered and when it is 
no longer needed, whether because a drug is already approved 
or because treatment is offered in a clinical setting rather than 
a research setting. 
The LHS has a broader focus than just FDA-regulated prod-
ucts. An LHS considers—or at least, can consider—the full pro-
cess of care, including how doctors should interact with patients 
or which of many interventions (or nonintervention) works best. 
That may involve determinations that in fact, no drug should be 
used in a particular treatment plan—something outside FDA’s 
traditional ambit.154 Nevertheless, an LHS can help gather more 
targeted information about drugs as well. The next Part focuses 
on how information is gathered in an LHS, and how that infor-
mation and those processes can be used to inform a more flexible 
FDA drug-approval regime. 
III.  LEARNING ABOUT DRUGS IN A LEARNING HEALTH 
SYSTEM   
A flexible FDA approval process requires actually generat-
ing useful, detailed, postapproval information about drug safety 
and especially efficacy, which is hard; an LHS system can make 
it easier. An LHS enables the generation of in-depth information 
and lowers barriers to access to make such studies accessible to 
a wider range of researchers and analysts. 
Tools to gather information about drugs can be roughly 
grouped into two sets: interventional and observational.155 In in-
terventional studies, the researcher (broadly defined) does some-
thing deliberate—intervenes—with respect to the object of study 
and measures the result based on the intervention.156 Random-
ized-control clinical trials are the paradigmatic interventional 
 
 154. Cf. Rachel E. Sachs, Administering Health Innovation, 39 CARDOZO L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 36–37), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3013895 (describing the need for research on talk ther-
apy as an alternative to drugs). 
 155. See John Concato et al., Randomized, Controlled Trials, Observational 
Studies, and the Hierarchy of Research Designs, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1887, 
1888 (2000). 
 156. Jarow et al., supra note 125, at 703 (“1 or more human research partic-
ipants are prospectively assigned to 1 or more interventions to evaluate the ef-
fect of those interventions . . . .”). 
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study.157 Observational studies are different; rather than inter-
vening, researchers gather data about what is already happen-
ing in the world and try to draw inferences from patterns in 
those data.158 
Observational studies have some substantial advantages. 
They are typically cheaper, and they can often use large amounts 
of data retrospectively without the need to recruit partici-
pants.159 They can bring data together from many sources and, 
by virtue of the variety and volume of data they can incorporate, 
they can help identify complex patterns in larger populations.160 
But observational studies typically cannot demonstrate causa-
tion; it is challenging to show that a particular patient charac-
teristic or treatment causes an outcome, particularly when the 
researcher cannot control for other variables.161 
Interventional studies can show causation by, for instance, 
randomly assigning some patients to get one drug and other pa-
tients another, or a placebo.162 The random assignment enables 
the researcher to avoid selection bias and to conclude that differ-
ent results are caused by different interventions rather than 
some other underlying factor.163 But interventional studies have 
their own challenges; they are typically expensive to run and can 
be hard to fill with subjects.164 Postmarket interventional stud-
ies are especially challenging to conduct. For classic randomized 
clinical trials, the same limitations as described above apply—
smaller sample sets, limited populations, expense, short time pe-
riods—with the further limitation that patients don’t need to 
participate to get the drug because they can get it through regu-
lar clinical care.165 
 
 157. Id. (noting that the clinical trial enterprise is “based largely on random-
ized clinical trials”). 
 158. Id. (“Studies in which individuals are observed with no attempt to affect 
the outcome are observational.”). 
 159. See John Concato, Observational Versus Experimental Studies: What’s 
the Evidence for a Hierarchy?, 1 NEURORX 341, 345 (2004) (“[O]bservational 
studies often are cheaper, quicker, and less difficult to carry out . . . .”). 
 160. See Stuart Silverman, From Randomized Controlled Trials to Observa-
tional Studies, 122 AM. J. MED. 114, 114 (2009). 
 161. See Jarow et al., supra note 125, at 703. 
 162. See id. (“Randomization within the context of an interventional clinical 
trial is intended to balance confounders, both known and unknown.”). 
 163. See id. 
 164. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text (noting problems with 
clinical trials). 
 165. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
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An LHS promises to substantially enhance the ability of var-
ious actors—FDA, health systems, and drug sponsors alike—to 
conduct interventional and observational studies. Congress has 
emphasized the importance of using evidence from ongoing care 
to improve the FDA information-gathering process in particu-
lar.166 In the Cures Act, Congress required FDA to “establish a 
program to evaluate the potential use of real world evidence” to 
conduct postapproval surveillance for drugs.167 The Sections be-
low explore how this type of real-world evidence could be lever-
aged to gather information about drugs through both observa-
tional and interventional studies in the context of an LHS. 
A. OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES 
Observational studies find patterns in health data. For in-
stance, in the widely publicized case of the painkiller Vioxx, re-
searchers working at the integrated health system Kaiser Per-
manente collaborated with FDA’s Dr. David Graham to examine 
the safety of the drug.168 They compared health records of Kaiser 
Permanente patients who took Vioxx with those of patients tak-
ing older painkillers and found a higher rate of heart attacks 
among the Vioxx patients.169 These findings eventually helped 
lead to Merck’s withdrawing its drug Vioxx from the market—
though only after the findings were confirmed by data Merck re-
luctantly disclosed from ongoing interventional clinical trials 
testing whether Vioxx helped prevent another condition.170 In 
general, postmarket surveillance today relies on observations ra-
ther than interventions—watching to see signs of potential prob-
lems (or benefits) and then analyzing existing data to see 
whether these effects are consistent and predictable.171 
 
 166. See, e.g., 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. 114-255, § 3022, 130 Stat. 
1033, 1096–98 (2016) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 505F (2012) ). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 33, at 10–11. 
 169. David J. Graham et al., Risk of Acute Myocardial Infarction and Sud-
den Cardiac Death in Patients Treated with Cyclooxygenase 2 Selective and Non-
Selective Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs: Nested Case-Control Study, 
365 LANCET 475, 475–77 (2005). 
 170. See Robert S. Bresalier et al., Cardiovascular Events Associated with 
Rofecoxib in a Colorectal Adenoma Chemoprevention Trial, 352 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1092 (2005) (concluding that the drug use “was associated with an in-
creased cardiovascular risk”); Eisenberg & Price, supra note 33, at 11 (noting 
Merck’s reluctance to share its data). 
 171. See supra Section I.B.1.b. 
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LHSs promise to increase the possibilities of interventional 
and observational studies, because gathering observations com-
prises much of the core of any such learning system. In an LHS, 
data are constantly generated about the process of treatment 
and captured in EHRs and health databases.172 Ideally, these 
data can be supplemented from other sources of relevant health 
data, such as personal health monitors or fitness trackers.173 
LHS data are deliberately made available for observational 
studies—indeed, that’s the point.174 Such studies can note the 
same sort of problem as appeared in the Vioxx case; indeed, the 
Sentinel system (itself touted as an example of learning-health-
system approaches) is designed to notice just such safety prob-
lems, despite the challenges noted above.175 In a more robust vi-
sion of an LHS, such studies would identify not only problems, 
but also new uses, comparative effectiveness,176 and differential 
efficacy among different patients—all of which could potentially 
feed back into ongoing FDA oversight of drugs.177 
Some observational studies are explicitly mapped out be-
forehand—which drug of a small set works better, what side ef-
fects exist and can be linked to other characteristics, or the 
like178—but observational studies can also encompass more com-
plicated possibilities. The availability of very large collections of 
health data enables a developing subset of observational re-
search: the use of machine-learning techniques to develop 
“black-box” algorithms that can make predictions and recom-
mendations based on very complex patterns found within the 
data.179 This new form of analysis has great potential and raises 
its own FDA-related questions, both with regard to regulating 
 
 172. See INST. OF MED., LEARNING HEALTHCARE, supra note 7, at 48 (“Well-
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algorithms and to how algorithms might generate or interpret 
new drug-related data.180 
Overall, observational studies are a key part of LHSs, and 
the blurring of clinical and research care promises to generate 
tremendous amounts of data for those studies, and the chance to 
use the results of those studies to rapidly improve care. 
B. INTERVENTIONAL STUDIES 
LHSs can also facilitate interventional studies, though this 
approach has received somewhat less attention. EHRs, in partic-
ular, could make pragmatic trials (that is, trials of real-world in-
terventions in a real-world setting181) much easier to conduct. 
EHRs can already be used as a source of data for identifying po-
tential trial participants (which makes trials easier), but this is 
just the first step. To go further, EHR systems could identify pa-
tients for a trial in a particular institutional context—perhaps 
one institution, or perhaps a multi-institutional collaboration—
could automatically assign patients to trials, and could even ap-
ply the pragmatic randomization, all within the context of the 
electronic system.182 (The ethics-focused reader has immediately 
jumped to the issue of informed consent, which I discuss be-
low).183 
This is all a bit abstract, so let’s take an example. Imagine 
that we have two drugs, both of which treat chronic migraines: 
Nonopain and Decapitor. As a profession, clinicians are uncer-
tain which drug is better, a concept known as clinical equi-
poise.184 Both are FDA-approved after showing significant de-
creases in pain in about twenty-five percent of chronic-migraine 
sufferers, but the clinical trials did not gather enough evidence 
to predict which patients should use Nonopain and which should 
use Decapitor. Accordingly, clinicians prescribe one or the 
 
 180. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 
116 MICH. L. REV. 421 (2017). 
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 182. See Jarow et al., supra note 125, at 704. 
 183. See infra Section IV.A. 
 184. Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research, 317 
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other—based on their own perceptions of anecdotal patient evi-
dence or on marketing by companies—and wait to see if it works; 
if it doesn’t, they switch and hope the other works better. This is 
how we prescribe lots of drugs.185 
Now imagine an EHR-mediated pragmatic clinical trial to 
determine whether one is actually better. When a patient is 
newly diagnosed with chronic migraines, the EHR system (into 
which the treating provider enters the diagnosis) notes that the 
patient is a relevant participant in the ongoing study, internally 
randomizes between Nonopain and Decapitor, and recommends 
to the treating provider that the resulting drug be prescribed—
within seconds of the diagnosis being entered. Of course, the pro-
vider can reject the recommendation, but by hypothesis she has 
no a priori reason to do so. The EHR system gathers information 
about the patient’s reactions to the drug over time: are his mi-
graines better, and does he suffer any adverse reactions? These 
data can come not only from EHRs, but also from self-tracking, 
as when the patient enters information into his smartphone-
based migraine-tracking program.186 Over time, the system 
gathers data—systematically—about which patients do better. 
Maybe Nonopain is actually better than Decapitor across the 
board (that is, it helps the same group of patients but helps them 
more). Or maybe Decapitor is better for men and postmenopau-
sal women, while Nonopain is better for premenopausal 
women—or perhaps some much more complex constellation of 
characteristics that is better suited for machine-learning-based 
grouping than straightforward interventional analysis.187 The 
point is that this type of study can be tremendously streamlined 
by integration with EHRs within the context of an LHS, and can 
consequently become more common, more affordable, and more 
efficient. 
This model is not as far off as it might sound. Derek Angus 
explores this idea in some depth, arguing that an ideal LHS 
would fuse randomized trials with big data, because trials are 
 
 185. See, e.g., Scott Ely, Personalized Medicine: Individualized Care of Can-
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needed to determine causation.188 He argues that essentially 
everyone getting treatment should be part of ongoing EHR-me-
diated clinical trials when the treatment path is uncertain.189 
Angus suggests the idea of adaptive trials: even within the con-
text of an ongoing study, the LHS can take accumulating evi-
dence into account.190 If evidence suggests that one drug in an 
ongoing trial is moderately likely to be better than another, 
though uncertainty remains, the EHR-mediated trial could im-
plement an imbalanced randomization so that patients would be 
more likely to get the (probably) better drug.191 This has the pos-
itive effect that patients in the ongoing trial would, on average, 
do better than either patients in an equally randomized trial or 
in standard clinical care, where uncertainty would also not yet 
give them a higher chance of the (probably) better drug.192 This 
system, of course, relies on the availability of high-quality, accu-
rate EHRs as well as buy-in by participants in the LHS. 
Regulators seem on board with the idea. Califf and his FDA 
colleagues recognized in 2016 the increasing importance of real-
world evidence about drug effects, and emphasized the im-
portance of randomized interventional studies real-world con-
texts.193 They specifically encouraged the expansion of random-
ized trials outside of academic medical centers.194 They also 
noted that the importance of real-world evidence is not in 
whether it is interventional or randomized, but rather that is 
takes place in a more generalizable real-world context—pre-
cisely the type of evidence enabled by an LHS.195 Section 3022 of 
the Cures Act encourages FDA to explore the use of real-world 
evidence to support fulfilling postapproval study requirements 
or adding new indications for approved drugs, and these embed-
ded pragmatic trials would fall within that scope.196 
 
 188. See Derek C. Angus, Fusing Randomized Trials with Big Data: The Key 
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In fact, to the extent that FDA enthusiastically supports the 
idea of pragmatic clinical trials in LHSs as a way to fulfill post-
marketing study observations—and the Agency seems to be mov-
ing in that direction—it may actively help propel the growth and 
development of LHSs. FDA has already issued guidance on the 
use of real-world evidence to evaluate medical devices,197 and it 
is developing the National Evaluation System for Health Tech-
nology (NEST)—a system originally conceived as a safety-sur-
veillance system for medical devices, but has since broadened to 
include evaluation and evidence collection more generally.198 
Commissioner Gottlieb has stated that FDA’s upcoming guid-
ance on the use of such evidence for drugs, mandated under the 
Cures Act,199 will include “a detailed description of [real-world 
evidence] and its potential applications for satisfying aspects of 
FDA’s pre- and postmarket requirements.”200 If drug companies 
are motivated to pursue pragmatic clinical trials, developing the 
capacity to conduct those trials cheaply and efficiently will also 
support the capacity to conduct other pragmatic clinical trials—
including for purposes beyond those mentioned in the Cures Act, 
such as comparative effectiveness research, and for deployment 
by actors other than drug companies themselves. 
C. POTENTIAL ACTORS 
LHSs also promise to broaden the possible scope of who can 
conduct studies, whether observational or interventional. Obser-
vational studies present the easier case. To the extent that rou-
tine, high-quality data collection results in high-quality da-
tasets, those datasets could be made more broadly available to 
enable observational studies by more than just the few players 
who can afford the expense of assembling their own datasets.201 
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FDA could run its own studies, and drug sponsors as well—that’s 
the case now—but so could hospitals, health systems, academics, 
and others, given access to observational datasets.202 And, less 
typically, health-care payers could more readily run their own 
studies to address questions of comparative effectiveness, off-la-
bel uses, safety, and cost-effectiveness for existing drugs.203 This 
is not to say that these actors don’t already run observational 
studies—some do.204 But more actors could feasibly access data 
and run studies in an LHS.205 Of course, there are legal and prac-
tical challenges around access to data, some of which will be dis-
cussed below, but at least the possibility of broader access exists. 
Similarly, though to a lesser extent, interventional trials 
could come within reach for a broader range of actors once those 
trials can be largely automated through EHR-mediated patient 
selection and intervention assignment. The sort of trial de-
scribed above in the Nonopain example could be run not only by 
drug companies or academics with substantial grants, but also 
by essentially any health-care system or affiliated actor.206 As 
Angus writes, at least one possible ideal is that the vast majority 
of patients receiving care are actively contributing to systema-
tized knowledge—not only through providing data for observa-
tional studies, but by a process in which their care itself system-
atically contributes to generating causal inferences through 
carefully calibrated (and sometimes randomized) interven-
tions.207 
IV.  CHALLENGES FROM BRIGHT-LINE RULES   
While both FDA flexibility and LHSs blur lines between re-
search and nonresearch—to good effect—some areas of law re-
main based on bright-line rules that are likely to hamper and 
bias the development of postapproval information. These bright 
lines and hard-wired policies create real challenges in moving 
forward to a system where information is constantly gathered, 
constantly analyzed, and constantly used to improve the process 
of regulating drugs and providing health care. Two areas are 
particularly salient: (1) informed consent rules governing the 
conduct of care and of research; and (2) privacy rules governing 
 
 202. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 33, at 41–44. 
 203. Id. at 14–23. 
 204. Id. at 42–43. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See Angus, supra note 188, at 767–68. 
 207. Id. 
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the collection, transfer, and use of personal health infor-
mation.208 
A. INFORMED CONSENT 
As a default rule, obtaining informed consent of patients and 
research subjects is both a legal and an ethical duty. The federal 
Common Rule generally requires that all federally funded re-
search involving human subjects obtain informed consent from 
participants; many institutions expand this requirement to in-
clude all human subjects research, federally funded or not.209 
This informed consent must be written and must include several 
required elements.210 FDA separately requires informed consent 
for interventional studies conducted on drugs, even if the re-
search is non-federally-funded.211 Because the FDA require-
ments apply only to “clinical investigations”212 that are “experi-
ment[s] . . . involv[ing] a test article,”213 they do not appear to 
cover purely observational studies.214 Waivers of the consent re-
quirements are available in limited circumstances, but can be 
 
 208. Another set of substantial hurdles for research involves oversight by 
Investigational Review Boards (IRBs) more generally, which must approve hu-
man subject research. For overviews and criticisms of IRBs as censors of 
knowledge and research, see generally CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE CENSOR ’S 
HAND: THE MISREGULATION OF HUMAN-SUBJECT RESEARCH (2015) (criticizing 
IRBs as unaccountable, opaque, and unguided by clear rules); Philip Ham-
burger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 
271 (criticizing IRBs on First Amendment grounds). 
 209. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2017). For a discussion of the Common Rule, includ-
ing its scope and purpose, see, for example, Michelle N. Meyer, Regulating the 
Production of Knowledge: Research Risk-Benefit Analysis and the Heterogeneity 
Problem, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 237, 243–50 (2013). State law also creates duties to 
obtain informed consent in the context of clinical care and in some research con-
texts, though these state requirements exist within the context of medical mal-
practice law and are relatively underdeveloped in the research context. See 
Noah, supra note 51, at 364–79. Accordingly, this Section will focus on federal 
law, and the Common Rule in particular. 
 210. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (listing general informed-consent requirements); id. 
§ 46.117 (requiring that informed consent be obtained in writing). Consent 
forms are reviewed by IRBs for compliance. 
 211. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (2017) (listing informed-consent elements); id. § 50.27 
(requiring that informed consent be obtained in writing). 
 212. Id. § 50.1 (limiting applicable scope of FDA requirements to “clinical 
investigations”). 
 213. Id. § 50.3(c) (defining “clinical investigation”). 
 214. See Evans, supra note 71, at 591 (arguing that it is unclear whether 
FDA human-subjects regulations apply to section 505(o)(3) postmarket obser-
vational studies). 
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difficult to obtain.215 Until recently, FDA waivers were much 
more restricted than Common Rule waivers, but those require-
ments have recently been harmonized by the Cures Act.216 
A proposed new version of the Common Rule was released 
in 2017, although the revisions are still under consideration as 
of this writing. The new draft contains two proposed changes 
that are especially significant for observational studies of exist-
ing information.217 First, individuals could give “broad consent” 
when they provide private information or biospecimens, which 
would cover a wide range of identified-patient studies going for-
ward; databases made up of information obtained under such 
broad consent would not require additional consent for later re-
search.218 Second, if the researcher’s own use of health infor-
mation is governed by the HIPAA Privacy Rule,219 that use 
would be exempt from Common Rule requirements.220 
 
 215. Evans, supra note 71, at 590. Under the Common Rule, informed con-
sent requirements can be waived by an IRB if: “(1) [t]he research involves no 
more than minimal risk” (defined as the risks encountered in daily life); “(2) 
[t]he waiver will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects; (3) 
[t]he research could not be practicably be carried out without the waiver . . . ; 
and (4) . . . the subjects will be provided with additional pertinent information 
after participation” if appropriate. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d). For an ethical defense 
of informed-consent waivers, see Michelle N. Meyer, Two Cheers for Corporate 
Experimentation: The A/B Illusion and the Virtues of Data-Driven Innovation, 
13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 273 (2015). 
 216. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3022, 130 Stat. 1033, 
1096–98 (2016); see FDA, IRB WAIVER OR ALTERATION OF INFORMED CONSENT 
FOR CLINICAL INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING NO MORE THAN MINIMAL RISK TO 
HUMAN SUBJECTS: GUIDANCE FOR SPONSORS, INVESTIGATORS, AND INSTITU-
TIONAL REVIEW BOARDS 3 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM566948.pdf (noting that FDA intends to 
revise its informed-consent guidelines to allow waivers under the same circum-
stances as permitted under the Common Rule and announcing FDA’s intention 
not to object to IRB waivers for those circumstances prior to promulgation of the 
revised regulations). 
 217. Federal Policy for Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 
(Jan. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46). 
 218. Id. at 7266. Some biobanks have long taken advantage of the broad con-
sent procedures provided by the Common Rule’s informed-consent waiver pro-
visions by arguing that obtaining only narrow consent makes biobanking infea-
sible. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 219. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 220. Federal Policy for Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7262. 
This requirement would apply only to data use, and not to data sharing with 
other parties. Id. (explaining that consent is not needed for secondary research 
“involv[ing] only information collection and analysis involving the investigator ’s 
use of identifiable health information”). 
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1. Implications 
The requirement of obtaining informed consent for research 
studies creates hurdles that can impact whether and how a 
study goes forward.221 Obtaining informed consent can cost doz-
ens to hundreds of dollars per subject, can consume substantial 
time, and can bias the studied population.222 This is not always 
a problem for relatively small preapproval studies, but creates a 
high barrier for large-scale postapproval studies, especially 
without the incentive of drug approval.223 Merely giving drugs to 
patients in the course of clinical care, on the other hand, requires 
relatively minimal consent procedures, if any at all.224 Anna 
Laakmann quotes one physician pointing out the irony of requir-
ing IRB approval for clinical trials after drugs have been ap-
proved by FDA for treatment: “I need permission to give a new 
drug to half of my patients, but not to give it to them all.”225 
Michelle Meyer describes this broader phenomenon as the “A/B 
illusion”—“the widespread tendency to view a field experiment 
designed to study the effects of an existing or proposed practice 
as more morally suspicious than an immediate, universal imple-
mentation of an untested practice.”226 
 
 221. See, e.g., Kass et al., supra note 147, at S12 (noting the “burdens and 
costs of extensive oversight”). Not all agree. See, e.g., Sarpatwari et al., supra 
note 112, at 2329 (“[W]e suggest that the line between research and treatment 
is inconsequential. In the literature on informed consent, it is well settled that 
patients and research subjects should alike be informed of all material facts.”); 
cf. Laakmann, supra note 6, at 346 (suggesting that informed-consent rules for 
observational studies should mirror those used for randomized clinical trials). 
 222. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, Protecting Privacy in Health Research: The Lim-
its of Individual Choice, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1765, 1789–93 (2010) (discussing costs 
of obtaining informed consent); Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing 
Privacy, Autonomy, and Scientific Needs in Electronic Health Records Research, 
65 SMU L. REV. 85, 123 (2012) (reviewing empirical evidence on costs of obtain-
ing informed consent); Sian Noble et al., Feasibility and Cost of Obtaining In-
formed Consent for Essential Review of Medical Records in Large-Scale Health 
Services Research, 14 J. HEALTH SERV. RES. & POL’Y 77 (2009) (finding costs of 
approximately $248 per person to obtain written informed consent); Jack V. Tu 
et al., Impracticability of Informed Consent in the Registry of the Canadian 
Stroke Network, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1414 (2004) (finding costs of around sev-
enty Canadian dollars per subject to obtain informed consent, but obtaining con-
sent for under fifty percent of subjects and finding substantial selection bias). 
 223. See, e.g., Mark J. Pletcher et al., Informed Consent in Randomized 
Quality Improvement Trials: A Critical Barrier for Learning Health Systems, 
174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 668, 668 (2014) (“With optimal use of [EHR]s, the 
administrative costs of a trial need not increase with the sample size; this de-
coupling of costs and size facilitates large, simple, and inexpensive trials . . . .”). 
 224. See, e.g., Darrow, supra note 63, at 820–21. 
 225. Laakmann, supra note 6, at 313. 
 226. Meyer, supra note 215, at 278. 
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Of course, this could all be perfectly justified. Research is 
different from clinical care; research aims first to create gener-
alizable knowledge, while clinical care aims first to help the pa-
tient, and this distinction is deeply embedded in practice, ethics, 
and law.227 One prominent report noted five reasons for the dis-
tinction between research and care: (1) the aim for generalizable 
knowledge; (2) the requirement of systematic investigation; (3) 
the potential for additional risks to patients in research care 
(such as extra blood draws); (4) the imposition of research-re-
lated burdens not required by clinical care; and (5) the relatively 
inflexible, protocol-driven nature of care in a research context.228 
Another argument notes that the relationship between patient 
and provider differs substantially from that between patient and 
researcher, and that more oversight is thus needed to protect pa-
tients in the latter context.229 
Nevertheless, we might think that the standard rules for in-
formed consent don’t make as much sense in an LHS where the 
sharp distinction between research and clinical care becomes 
blurred.230 Informed-consent rules and ethical oversight prac-
tices were designed to be applied when behavior fits into the tra-
ditional box of research. Nancy Kass, Ruth Faden, and their col-
leagues offer several reasons why the imposition of these rules 
fits poorly with an LHS.231 
For one thing, the type of blended research and care that 
happens in an LHS may well be just as safe—or safer!—than 
standard clinical care.232 If the study is about a quality improve-
ment intervention that we have reason to suspect will improve 
care (giving a drug at more even interval rather than once daily, 
for instance), patients should be better off with a fifty percent 
chance of the intervention than having no chance.233 In the type 
of adaptive clinical trial suggested by Angus, as the system ac-
 
 227. In the Common Rule, for instance, research is defined as “a systematic 
investigation . . . designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.” 
45 C.F.R. § 46.102 (2017). 
 228. Kass et al., supra note 147, at S6–S12 (listing these reasons and argu-
ing they do not apply sharply in the context of an LHS). 
 229. Compare id., with Brody & Miller, supra note 148, at 45–46 (arguing 
that Kass and colleagues fail to consider the role played by experimentation in 
these two relationships). 
 230. See Kass et al., supra note 147, at S4–S5. 
 231. Id. at S11–S12. 
 232. See Pletcher et al., supra note 223, at 669. 
 233. Id. 
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cumulates knowledge about which drug seems better among al-
ternatives, patients can be randomized to be more likely to get 
the better drug—again leaving them better off than under the 
standard of care or a completely randomized trial.234 And even if 
we know nothing and instead just randomize among otherwise 
equal drugs, patients are arguably no worse off than under the 
standard of care.235 As Kass, Faden, and colleagues argue, this 
distinction also cuts the other way—the current system harms 
patients by failing to gather information about currently under-
informed clinical interventions.236 Unlike the classic distinction 
between research and clinical care where one group (research 
participants) undergoes research that will eventually benefit a 
second group (future patients), here, those groups are essentially 
the same, and all participants of an LHS could potentially reap 
the benefits of the learning.237 
Finally, the very fact of an artificial distinction about clini-
cal oversight and informed consent is impractical—the 
Faden/Kass group notes how the distinction creates substantial 
uncertainty among IRBs238 and argues that this has problematic 
dynamic effects on how studies may be conducted: 
The fuzziness of the distinction [between research and practice], cou-
pled with the oversight burdens that are required of research but not 
of practice, creates dubious incentives to redesign quality improvement 
and comparative effectiveness activities in ways that minimize the 
likelihood that they will be classified as research, even at the cost of 
their rigor, utility, dissemination, or value.239 
So what do bright-line informed-consent rules mean for the 
goal of a more flexible information-gathering regime around 
 
 234. See Angus, supra note 188, at 768. 
 235. See generally OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DRAFT GUIDANCE ON DISCLOSING REASONABLY 
FORESEEABLE RISKS IN RESEARCH EVALUATING STANDARDS OF CARE (2014), 
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/requests-for-comments/draft 
-guidance-disclosing-risk-in-standards-of-care/index.html. 
 236. Kass et al., supra note 147, at S11 (“[P]atients may have surgery at the 
hands of surgeons or teams who rarely perform such an operation, despite em-
pirical evidence that low-volume hospitals have worse outcomes than high-vol-
ume hospitals. In many respects, these patients are experimental subjects . . . 
with the indefensible difference being that their experience will not inform the 
treatment of others.”); see also Darrow, supra note 63, at 809–14 (characterizing 
patient use of recently approved drugs as human experimentation but without 
informed consent safeguards). 
 237. See Meyer, supra note 215, at 274–79. 
 238. Kass et al., supra note 147, at S11. 
 239. Faden et al., supra note 147, at S16–S17. 
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FDA approval in an LHS? Essentially, it makes it harder to con-
duct large-scale interventional studies about drugs (or other-
wise) by leveraging the capabilities of an LHS. Automating the 
process of adding patients to ongoing clinical trials, as described 
above, and automating their assignment between equally bene-
ficial interventions—or randomly assigning the possibility of an 
extra, likely beneficial intervention—would require individual-
ized consent, even though such interventions are either neutral 
or positive compared to the baseline of normal care.240 And in-
formed consent carries costs that scale with the number of par-
ticipants.241 Such a requirement might make frequent, large-
scale interventional studies impractical or too expensive to un-
dertake in an LHS. 
And for observational studies about drug effects? There, too, 
the informed consent requirements scale with the number of par-
ticipants,242 but there are two ways to avoid those costs. First, 
anonymizing data takes them outside the ambit of the Common 
Rule (as well as the HIPAA Privacy Rule, described below).243 
However, anonymizing data often results in incomplete pictures 
because of the difficulty of aggregating data across different 
sources and especially over time.244 Being unable to aggregate 
data degrades the ability to observe rare or long-term effects. 
Anonymizing data also limits access to other useful identity-
linked information such as family histories.245 Second, under the 
proposed revisions to the Common Rule, broad consent could be 
used to obtain prospective consent for all data-based observa-
tional studies. Broad consent eliminates the scaling effects of re-
consent costs for future studies, but it would help resolve prob-
lems with existing datasets, or to lower the burdens of obtaining 
consent in the first place. 
Put together, these requirements push the development of 
new information about drugs away from what an LHS seeks—a 
mix of neutral-to-beneficial interventional studies coupled with 
 
 240. Faden and colleagues argue that for such research, rather than full in-
formed consent, notice that care is being provided in an LHS should suffice. Id. 
at S24–S25. 
 241. See supra notes 221–23 and accompanying text. 
 242. See, e.g., Tu et al., supra note 222, at 7–10; Hoffman & Podgurski, supra 
note 222, at 123. 
 243. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2017). 
 244. See infra notes 279–80 and accompanying text. 
 245. See Roger Allan Ford & W. Nicholson Price II, Privacy and Accounta-
bility in Black-Box Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 21–24 
(2016). 
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broad ongoing observational studies.246 Instead, it promotes a 
rocky status quo of limited (or frequently infeasible) postmarket 
surveillance, often with anonymous data, supplemented by for-
mal clinical trials where FDA firmly requires them. Inflexible 
informed consent requirements are likely to leave many of the 
benefits of the LHS on the table. Now, this might be justifiable—
Barbara Evans writes, 
There is no “research imperative” that compels us, as a society, to pro-
ceed with postmarketing drug safety studies merely because they have 
the potential to save patients’ lives. It is perfectly legitimate to question 
whether the attempt to save lives is sufficient ethical justification for 
the unconsented [or less-consented] use of private health data.247 
But given the benefits promised by an LHS—that such systems 
attempt to save lives, whether through better practice guidelines 
or more effective drug approval—we should explicitly question 
whether the sharply delimited informed-consent rules con-
structed decades ago still make sense. The line blurring in an 
LHS and in the FDA approval process suggest that informed con-
sent, too, could be less rigid.248 
2. Potential Improvements 
Resolving the informed-consent conundrum presents chal-
lenges. Obtaining informed consent protects the value of auton-
omy (though informed consent as practiced today does not do so 
especially well).249 But like the privacy rule, imposing the hurdle 
of obtaining a specific form of informed consent based on a bright 
line between research and not-research does a poor job of pro-
tecting patients in the context of an LHS.250 It seems reasonable 
to consider the possibility that, at least for research that involves 
nothing riskier than choosing between standard-of-care options 
 
 246. See Sherman et al., supra note 32, at 2294–96; Califf et al., supra note 
13, at 2396. 
 247. Evans, supra note 71, at 605. 
 248. Faden et al., supra note 147, at S24–S25; Pletcher et al., supra note 223, 
at 669. 
 249. See Jay Katz, Informed Consent—Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 69, 84 (1994) (arguing that informed consent as 
practiced is “largely a charade which misleads patients into thinking that they 
are making decisions when indeed they are not”); see also Matthew E. Falagas 
et al., Informed Consent: How Much and What Do Patients Understand?, 
198 AM. J. SURGERY 420, 432 (2009) (reviewing studies regarding informed con-
sent for surgical interventions and concluding that “adequate overall under-
standing by the patients . . . was reported in less than one-third of the studies”). 
 250. See Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Reshma Jagsi, Big Data, Ethics, and 
Regulations: Implications for Consent in the Learning Health System, 45 MED. 
PHYSICS (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2–3) (on file with author). 
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in clinical equipoise, the consent we require for medical treat-
ment could also suffice as consent for research participation, per-
haps supplemented by general notice provisions in the place of 
care.251 
Blending informed consent so that clinical consent does dou-
ble duty as consent to nonrisky research would face substantial 
difficulties. The difference between research and clinical care is 
deeply embedded within American bioethics, as are the preemi-
nence of autonomy and special protections for research partici-
pants.252 This would make reforming the legal rules challenging; 
in addition, some clinicians or clinician groups might conclude 
that ethical obligations would prohibit participation in such re-
search procedures independent of legal prohibitions. Political 
economy concerns exist as well; major revisions to the Common 
Rule were just completed after a years-long process, making an-
other substantial change in the near future unlikely.253 And even 
if policymakers were to agree that streamlined or assumed in-
formed-consent procedures may serve for particular benign in-
terventions or for observational studies with identifiable infor-
mation, the implementation of that decision would rest in the 
hands of variable and widely distributed IRBs.254 Although this 
local control brings its own challenges, it does mean that as in-
dividual IRBs gain experience with an LHS and become more 
aware of its benefits and protections, they may be willing to be 
more flexible and could potentially limit the costs of obtaining 
informed consent for broad observational or benign interven-
tional studies.255 
 
 251. See, e.g., Ruth R. Faden, Tom L. Beauchamp, & Nancy E. Kass, In-
formed Consent, Comparative Effectiveness, and Learning Health Care, 
370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 766, 767 (2014). 
 252. See supra note 147 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dif-
ferences between research and clinical intervention. 
 253. See Joshua D. Smith et al., Immortal Life of the Common Rule: Ethics, 
Consent, and the Future of Cancer Research, 35 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1879, 
1882 (2017). 
 254. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 208, at xx–xxi (describing the process by 
which IRBs are appointed, and noting that IRBs have virtually plenary discre-
tion in their decisions and are procedurally insulated from challenges). A sepa-
rate question is whether locally focused IRBs make sense for broadly distributed 
observational or interventional studies. 
 255. For more in-depth analysis of how informed consent could work in a 
mature LHS, see generally Pletcher et al., supra note 223; Smith et al., supra 
note 253. 
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B. PRIVACY 
The law of privacy also has a substantial impact on how in-
formation about drugs can be gathered, shared, and used in an 
LHS. The principal federal rule is the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (HIPAA)256 Privacy Rule,257 alt-
hough state privacy rules may also come into play.258 The Pri-
vacy Rule governs the disclosure and use by “covered entities” of 
“protected health information,” which includes most individually 
identifiable health information.259 “Covered entities” includes 
health-insurance plans, health-information clearinghouses, and 
most health-care providers; their business associates are also 
regulated by HIPAA.260 Covered entities cannot use or disclose 
protected health information except with the authorization of 
patients or for one of several permitted uses.261 
1. Permitted Use and Disclosure 
The Privacy Rule allows routine use and disclosure of pro-
tected health information for specific, normally permitted activ-
ities. Permitted uses include treatment and health-care opera-
tions; the latter includes “quality assessment and improvement 
activities[.]”262 But the category of health-care operations specif-
ically does not include activities whose “primary purpose” is de-
veloping “generalizable knowledge.”263 That constitutes “re-
search,” which is explicitly not a permitted activity for the use or 
disclosure of protected health information under the Privacy 
Rule.264 
The Privacy Rule also contains a set of potentially important 
permissions related to public-health activities. Under 45 C.F.R. 
§ 512(b), “A covered entity may use or disclose protected health 
information for the public health activities and purposes de-
scribed in this paragraph to: (i) A public health authority . . . [or] 
 
 256. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. 
 257. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 
45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2017). 
 258. Evans, supra note 71, at 594. 
 259. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. § 164.502. 
 262. Id. § 164.501. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. “Research” is defined in the Privacy Rule as “a systematic investi-
gation . . . designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.” Id. 
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(iii) [a] person subject to the jurisdiction of the [FDA.]”265 These 
two exceptions allow disclosures to FDA and to drug companies. 
Subsection iii allows disclosure to a person subject to FDA’s 
jurisdiction—would this ameliorate Privacy Rule restrictions on 
LHS studies about drugs? Not really. First, the exception applies 
only to drug companies, and so would not permit the disclosure 
of protected health information to, for example, academics or 
nonprofits, limiting the research-democratizing effect of an LHS. 
Second, the disclosure must be “with respect to an FDA-regu-
lated product or activity for which that person has responsibil-
ity.”266 As Barbara Evans has pointed out, this limits the allow-
able disclosure to data about the drug company’s own drugs.267 
This provision fails to enable the comparative work central to an 
LHS; in fact, as Evans notes, it likely does not even enable firms 
to conduct postmarket studies mandated by FDA under 
21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3).268 It facilitates updated reports of safety 
and efficacy to a company about its own drugs, but not much 
more. 
Subsection i allows disclosure to a “public health author-
ity.”269 While this allows disclosure of protected health infor-
mation to FDA, it does not allow disclosure or use by any other 
parties, whether drug companies, insurers, or otherwise. Thus 
FDA could conduct its own “public health investigations” by col-
lecting and using LHS data.270 But again, this allows neither the 
aggregation of protected health information across sources and 
time (via data disclosure) nor the wider ability to study drugs by 
non-FDA entities (via data use). Evans has suggested that once 
FDA has access to data—in the main, through its Sentinel sys-
tem—it can facilitate access to those data by routinely contract-
ing with drug companies or others as permitted by section 
505(k)(4) of the Food and Drug Amendments Act of 2007, which 
establishes procedures for “[a]dvanced analysis of drug safety 
data.”271 Whether or not that section allows such a scheme,272 
 
 265. Id. § 164.512(b)(1)(i), (iii). 
 266. Id. § 164.512(b)(1)(iii). 
 267. Evans, supra note 71, at 589. 
 268. Id. 
 269. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i). 
 270. Id. § 164.512(b)(2). 
 271. Evans, supra note 71, at 599–602; 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(4) (2012). 
 272. Evans argues that sections 505(k)(4)(D)(i)(II)–(IV) allow FDA to enter 
into contracts with drug sponsors to complete section 505(o)(3) postmarket stud-
ies using Sentinel data. Evans, supra note 71, at 599–602. While these provi-
sions envision FDA contracting with outside contractors to analyze safety data, 
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FDA has to date focused on drug safety, rather than on more 
expansive studies using Sentinel.273 Overall, section 512(b)’s 
permitted disclosures do not appear to cover most of the disclo-
sures needed to assemble data for an LHS.274 
 
section 505(k)(4)(H) requires FDA to use “competitive procedures” to enter into 
such contracts, which suggests that the role conceived under section 505(k)(4) 
is that of an organization undertaking analysis on FDA’s behalf, rather than 
drug sponsors using FDA’s Sentinel system to conduct their own section 
505(o)(3) studies. Id. 
 273. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 33, at 43. Although section 505(k)(4) 
focuses on drug safety, because the use of any drug entails a risk-benefit analy-
sis, it is at least a colorable argument that comparative benefit determinations 
fall within the scope of the collaborations allowed. The case for cost-focused re-
search is less clear. 
 274. The attentive reader will have noted that section 512(b)(1) permits not 
only disclosure, but also use: “A covered entity may use or disclose protected 
health information for the public health activities and purposes described in 
this paragraph to . . . .” 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1) (emphasis added). I have dis-
cussed disclosure, but what about use by the covered entity itself? Can a large 
health system conduct its own research using protected health information to 
produce generalizable knowledge for public health purposes under the “use” of 
“use or disclose?” Probably not. This section of the Rule is poorly worded, and 
any interpretation does some violence to its language, but the most reasonable 
interpretation does not allow use by the covered entity. 
The question is how to determine what the covered entity may “use,” and 
for what purpose. We could interpret “use or disclose” as a compound verb, mod-
ified by “for the public health activities and purposes described in this para-
graph,” but then it is difficult to see how the subsequent “to,” immediately fol-
lowing “paragraph,” applies only to one verb and not another. We could (with 
some creativity) interpret “to” as serving two purposes—one as the preposition 
connecting “disclose” to its indirect objects that follow (“disclose to” a public 
health authority, school, etc.), and the other as the first half of a badly split 
infinitive connecting “use” with various activities (“use to” analyze, interpret, 
etc.). But no such activities are listed in the following subsections. 
We could pull “protected health information for the public health activities 
and purposes described in this paragraph” from the middle of “disclose . . . to 
[various entities]” and apply it a second time to the verb “use,” but that is 
agrammatical. Furthermore, in the following subsections, each purpose “de-
scribed in [the] paragraph” is linked to a recipient of disclosed information: a 
public health authority to control disease, an employer to evaluate workplace 
injury, a school to check immunization status, and the like. 45 C.F.R. 
§ 512(b)(1)(i)–(vi) (2017). No purpose is described without a recipient, leaving 
unresolved the purposes for which information could be “used.” 
The best interpretation is probably to read “use” out of section 512(b)(1) 
entirely, since no limitations make grammatical or purposeful sense. Consistent 
with this interpretation, the immediately following section 512(b)(2), “permitted 
uses,” states, “if the covered entity also is a public health authority, the covered 
entity is permitted to use protected health information in all cases in which it is 
permitted to disclose such information for public health activities under para-
graph (b)(1) of this section.” (emphasis added). If section 512(b)(2) specifically 
permits a public health authority to use information it could disclose under sec-
tion 512(b)(1), reading section 512(b)(1) to allow such use already would make 
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2. Nonpermitted Use and Disclosure 
If the Privacy Rule does not normally allow a particular ac-
tivity, covered entities wishing to use or disclose protected health 
information have to work much harder. Under the Privacy Rule, 
the entity may either obtain authorization from each individual 
patient or obtain a waiver from a Privacy Board or an IRB.275 
The alternative is to rely on information not covered by the Pri-
vacy Rule at all, typically by using deidentified data which no 
longer qualifies as protected health information or the subject of 
human-subject research.276 
Each of these approaches brings its own challenges. Author-
ization by individual patients is costly and time-consuming to 
obtain, and may introduce bias: there are systematic differences 
between those who are willing to give permission for their infor-
mation to be used and those who are not.277 Waivers are gener-
ally hard to get, and, in the case of postmarket studies mandated 
by FDA under section 505(o)(3), they may be both hard to get 
and practically unusable.278 And using deidentified data creates 
its own set of problems (setting aside the contentious question of 
how well deidentification actually protects privacy)279: without 
 
section 512(b)(2) superfluous. In fact, the parallel section 512(d), “[u]ses and 
disclosures for health oversight activities,” follows exactly this structure, ad-
dressing only disclosure for health oversight activities in section 512(d)(1), with 
section 512(d)(4) permitting use if the covered entity is itself a health oversight 
agency. As between vitiating two difficult-to-reconcile words in section 512(b)(1) 
(“use and”) or the entirety of section 512(b)(2), the better reading is that section 
512(b)(1) does not in fact permit use of protected health information. 
 275. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(i) (2017). 
 276. Id. § 164.514(a). 
 277. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 71, at 580 (“In large-scale studies of this 
type, obtaining consent may be impracticable or may bias the dataset in ways 
that would reduce the scientific validity of the findings.”); Hoffman & Podgur-
ski, supra note 222, at 114–19 (discussing the bias introduced by consent re-
quirements). 
 278. See Evans, New Infrastructural Model, supra note 67, at 591 (“It may 
be hard to persuade IRBs that releasing data for use in a section 505(o)(3) study 
entails minimal privacy risk, because it is not clear that there is any regulatory 
framework in place to provide ethical and privacy protections for people whose 
data are used in such studies.”); id. at 593–94 (noting that even if waivers are 
obtained because FDA applies its own human-subjects protections to section 
505(o)(3) studies to alleviate IRB concerns, those protections do not allow such 
waivers and concluding that “if drug manufacturers can obtain insurance claims 
data and healthcare records, they will not be able to use them; if they can use 
them, then they probably will not be able to get them”). 
 279. An intense ongoing debate considers how well deidentification works to 
protect privacy; on the one hand, some reidentification techniques have been 
strikingly successful; on the other, some question whether there is a meaningful 
likelihood of any particular individual actually being reidentified. See, e.g., id. 
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identifying information, it ranges from hard to impossible to as-
semble data across different sources and timeframes to create 
robust datasets that cover enough time to catch rare or slow-to-
arise problems.280 
3. Implications 
This structure of the Privacy Rule has two important impli-
cations for the line blurring involved in an LHS. First, the Pri-
vacy Rule explicitly includes a sharp distinction between re-
search and treatment/health-care operations—research is about 
generalizable knowledge and the other uses are not.281 Second, 
the Privacy Rule privileges the use of data for health-care provi-
sion and operations in a way that it absolutely does not privilege 
the use of data to develop generalizable knowledge.282 The Pri-
vacy Rule’s sharp line creates a similarly sharp limit on the use 
of health-care data to improve understanding of health-care in-
terventions, including pharmaceuticals. 
In the Privacy Rule context, as in the case of informed con-
sent described above,283 the bright line results in perverse incen-
tives. As Rebecca Eisenberg and I have previously noted, “one 
might expect that as the analysis of health outcomes to improve 
clinical care becomes more scientifically rigorous (and its conclu-
sions therefore more generalizable), it may look less like permis-
sible ‘health-care operations’ and more like restricted ‘re-
search.’”284 If health systems avoid learning about generalizable 
knowledge—if they fail to pursue rigorous randomization proto-
cols, use careful controls, or all of the other best practices for an 
LHS—then they can pursue “quality improvement” activities or 
 
at 592 & n.124 (listing sources on this issue); Ford & Price, supra note 245, at 
23 & n.76 (listing sources); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding 
to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010) (ar-
guing that deidentification largely fails to protect privacy). 
 280. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 71, at 592 (discussing the need for longitu-
dinal health records in drug safety studies). These effects are somewhat ame-
liorated in the context of integrated providers that can aggregate data in-house. 
Some integrated providers, such as the Veterans Administration, are likely to 
also capture most patient health data over time; but these providers cover only 
a subset of patients. Eisenberg & Price, supra note 33, at 12–13. 
 281. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2017). 
 282. Sometimes this line is crossed; quality control initiatives sometimes get 
published and their insights therefore shared. But at least under the Privacy 
Rule, generalizable knowledge cannot be the purpose of such activities. See id. 
(drawing a sharp distinction between research and treatment/healthcare oper-
ations). 
 283. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
 284. Eisenberg & Price, supra note 33, at 36. 
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other health-care operations without the need to obtain individ-
ual authorizations or pursue difficult-to-acquire waivers.285 It is 
simply easier, under federal privacy rules governing health in-
formation, to avoid collecting and using information in a system-
atic way to create generalizable knowledge. It is easier, in other 
words, to avoid learning as a health system, and learning about 
drugs. 
4. Potential Improvements 
There is not an obvious consensus solution to the problems 
with HIPAA’s Privacy Rule. Some argue that privacy and control 
over information should be de-emphasized in favor of greater 
health-care knowledge.286 Others argue that privacy should not 
be sacrificed for greater knowledge, and suggest that if privacy 
limits the course of medical innovation, that is simply the cost 
we pay to protect the important value of privacy.287 Still others 
try to find a way around the problem; Evans has proposed that 
patients form data collaboratives that can manage their own 
data resources,288 and I have suggested elsewhere with Roger 
Ford that data should be shared relatively freely within a set of 
procedural privacy safeguards.289 The problem of balancing data 
access versus privacy remains a knotty and unsolved one, within 
the context of an LHS as elsewhere. Nonetheless, the bright line 
of the Privacy Rule, where information is privileged if it is used 
 
 285. Jeremy Sugarman & Robert M. Califf, Ethics and Regulatory Complex-
ities for Pragmatic Clinical Trials, 311 JAMA 2381, 2382 (2014). To be sure, 
there are other ways to avoid the strictures of the Privacy Rule or to use data 
within them in addition to the paths noted above. Evans, for instance, proposes 
that FDA should enter collaborative agreements with drug companies to allow 
them to use the Sentinel system to conduct 505(o)(3) postmarketing studies. 
Evans, supra note 71, at 597–603. 
 286. See Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Personal Privacy and 
Common Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under the National Health Infor-
mation Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1455 (2002) (arguing that, in situ-
ations where the potential for public benefit is high and the risk of harm to 
individuals is low, public entities should be able to acquire and use health-care 
data regardless of individual informed consent or other privacy protections); 
Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 222, at 124–25 (noting that social benefits 
may sometimes outweigh informed consent and privacy harms). 
 287. E.g., Peter D. Jacobson, Medical Records and HIPAA: Is It Too Late To 
Protect Privacy?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1497, 1499–1500 (2002); cf. Franklin G. Mil-
ler, Research on Medical Records Without Informed Consent, 36 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 560, 560 (2008) (arguing that practical and scientific considerations mil-
itate against requiring consent for population-based observational research). 
 288. See generally Barbara J. Evans, Power to the People: Data Citizens in 
the Age of Precision Medicine, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 243 (2016). 
 289. Ford & Price, supra note 245. 
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in an ad hoc fashion for certain purposes including health-care 
operations and care but not if used for systematic creation of 
data, seems to be particularly unhelpful. 
The drafters of the Cures Act recognized this problem, and 
initially chose to prioritize innovation over strong privacy pro-
tections. An early draft would have erased the bright line by con-
sidering “research” a subset of “healthcare operations” and 
therefore a permitted use under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, remov-
ing the artificial distinction between research and other permit-
ted uses.290 Nevertheless, the provision proved contentious, and 
the Act as passed does not include it.291 Instead, the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services is directed to convene a working 
group to examine whether to modify the Privacy Rule to allow 
research use.292 It remains unclear whether the working group 
will recommend the move to allow protected health information 
to be used for health research. 
Although a full analysis of the issue is outside the scope of 
this Article, the creation of a HIPAA exception for research 
makes at least prima facie sense. If we are willing to allow access 
to health data for a wide range of useful purposes—health care, 
health-care operations, public health, law enforcement, billing, 
and quality improvement—why not for research as well? In par-
ticular, it seems incongruous to allow access to existing infor-
mation for the purposes of care, and for the purposes of improv-
ing the quality of care in a relatively ad hoc fashion—but not for 
improving care through the systematic generation of generaliza-
ble knowledge.293 As with informed consent, the argument is 
that research serves a different set of interests—generalized in-
terests, rather than the specific interests of the patient—but 
given the existing HIPAA exceptions for public health, law en-
forcement, and billing purposes, those arguments seem less 
 
 290. 21st Century Cures Act, H.R. 6, 114th Cong. § 1124 (2015) (requiring 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to “revise or clarify the [HIPAA 
Privacy] Rule to allow the use and disclosure of protected health information by 
a covered entity for research purposes, including studies whose purpose is to 
obtain generalizable knowledge, to be treated as the use and disclosure of such 
information for health care operations”). 
 291. See Elizabeth Snell, Is Health Data Security at Risk in 21st Century 
Cures Bill?, HEALTH IT SECURITY: PATIENT PRIVACY NEWS (July 7, 2015), 
https://healthitsecurity.com/news/is-health-data-security-at-risk-in-21-century 
-cures-bill. 
 292. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 2063(c), 130 Stat. 1033, 
1081–82 (2016). 
 293. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 33, at 35–36 (noting that it is difficult 
to distinguish between these purposes). 
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weighty when compared with the goal of improving health care 
for patients in general. 
C. COMBINED IMPLICATIONS 
Combining the restrictions of privacy and informed consent 
paints a disheartening picture for LHSs in general and for 
postapproval drug information creation specifically. To be clear: 
I am not arguing against informed consent or privacy (or, for that 
matter, for them). They serve important goals, even if imper-
fectly. But applying them rigidly under a bright-line research-
versus-not-research framework leads to real problems in our 
ability to generate and use information to keep patients safe and 
to treat them well in an LHS. The privacy and informed-consent 
rules governing biomedical research were largely formulated 
decades ago, when research really was quite distinct from care. 
Now that the two are blending more—at least in certain con-
texts—it is worth asking whether the benefits of those bright-
line rules are outweighed by the costs they impose. 
In addition to general barriers described above, these re-
quirements may slant the type of research that does take place. 
The most straightforward research under both the Privacy Rule 
and the Common Rule’s informed consent requirement is obser-
vational research on anonymized data, because neither rule’s re-
quirements apply.294 But this type of research results in incom-
plete pictures of what is really happening.295 We should also 
expect to see researchers shying away from large-scale prag-
matic interventional studies, as consent and privacy costs scale 
with size (as opposed to a quasi-automated model which limits 
such cost-scaling296). Where interventional studies are needed—
whether because of FDA requirements or otherwise—they are 
more likely to be smaller-scale clinical trials to satisfy FDA re-
quirements, and clinical trials of course bring their own costs 
and their own risks.297 
Informed consent and privacy requirements make it hard to 
develop postapproval drug information in an LHS, and the best 
way forward is unclear. What does seem clear is that the artifi-
cially bright line between research uses and nonresearch uses is 
 
 294. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 287, at 560. 
 295. See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra Section III.A. 
 297. See Evans, supra note 71, at 578 (noting that making observational 
studies harder increases the need for interventional studies that carry greater 
costs for participants). 
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a problematic holdover from an earlier version of medical re-
search and the health system, and one which is unlikely to help 
FDA, and the health system more generally, do the best by pa-
tients. I have briefly suggested that a better path would be to 
treat research in an LHS more like routine clinical care—allow-
ing access to HIPAA-protected identifiable health information 
and permitting treatment-focused informed consent to do double 
duty as research-focused informed consent. Fully fleshing out 
and defending these possibilities is part of a much broader con-
versation about how law and ethics should regulate and facili-
tate an LHS—a conversation in which FDA and the process of 
drug approval and drug surveillance should be essential topics. 
CONCLUSION 
The health system is evolving, and the way FDA evaluates 
drugs is evolving with it. In each context, the sharp lines of the 
past—between research and treatment, and between unap-
proved and fully-approved drugs—are becoming blurred as we 
move to a world where the information created in clinical care is 
captured, analyzed, and used to improve the way we understand 
medical interventions going forward. To the extent that FDA al-
lows, promotes, or requires drug companies to use learning-
health-system-based trials to fulfill postmarketing study or sur-
veillance requirements, the Agency can help drive the adoption 
of LHS ideas. This is a development to be welcomed; the health 
system should learn, and we should continue to develop our 
knowledge of drugs long after they are approved. And if FDA 
learns more about drugs based on how they work in the real 
world, that information should be used to address how drugs are 
labeled, sold, and used.298 But while FDA and the health system 
are moving forward, the law hasn’t caught up. In particular, the 
federal law of informed consent and privacy continues to follow 
bright-line rules separating research from health care. That dis-
tinction makes it much harder for health-care system actors, 
whether drug firms or otherwise, to systematically gather, use, 
and learn from the data of clinical care. As health care generally, 
and FDA approval more specifically, evolves, those bright lines 
need to change with them. 
 
 298. See Patricia J. Zettler et al., Implementing a Public Health Perspective 
in FDA Drug Regulation, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 221 (2018) (arguing that FDA 
has the ability to incorporate many types of information into its regulatory de-
cisions, including real-world evidence of public health implications, and that the 
agency should take that information into account). 
